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		<title>Non Fiction</title>
		<description><![CDATA[Drama | Journalism | Essays | Poetry]]></description>
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			<title>The Death of the TV Author</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/culture-a-arts/item/143-the-death-of-the-tv-author</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/culture-a-arts/item/143-the-death-of-the-tv-author</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="K2FeedImage"><img src="http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/media/k2/items/cache/a9ccd7cd1c4267a50c67ac0bd7180172_S.jpg" alt="The Death of the TV Author" /></div><div class="K2FeedIntroText"><p>&nbsp;</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><img style="float: left; margin: 7px;" src="http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-images/Arts/Arts_/Pictures/2007/10/09/dennispotter460.jpg" alt="" />Having seen the excellent TV series, I'm disappointed by the novelisation of&nbsp;<em>Middlemarch.&nbsp;</em>George Eliot's book lacks the rigour and economy of &nbsp; Andrew Davies' original. Long authorial interventions ruin the immediacy and the balance between the characters of Lydgate and Dorothea has been lost. A brave attempt, but the adaptation begs the question posed by&nbsp;<em>To Play the King</em>: why reduce a good television series to a lesser book?</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">If this inversion of the usual literary bias doesn't seem entirely absurd, it's a tribute to the quality of British television drama. We often overestimate the international appeal of our output (it doesn't sell so well abroad) but there is little doubt of the medium's importance to our national culture. In Luton and Latin, from Breakfast Time to the Late Show, television is a central part of the dialogue we have with ourselves. And if one dramatist had to be thanked for high esteem of the medium, it must be Dennis Potter.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">The works Potter is hurrying to finish before his death,&nbsp;<em>Karaoke&nbsp;</em>and&nbsp;<em>Cold Lazarus,</em>&nbsp;will be his farewell to the form he shaped so much and to which he devoted his life. They could also be a long goodbye to the writer's eminence in the industry. Potter is recognised in the street, vilified in the tabloids. His plangent voice, mesmerizing in his last interview with Melvyn Bragg, has amused and accused on the broadest platforms. Potter has put television writers up there with the best of them and will be considered, without doubt, along with Pinter, Betjeman, or Amis as a key figure in postwar British writing. Less certain of survival, however, is the peculiarly British tradition of the TV author he helped invent.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">Script writers abound on television, but an author, one who originates form and content is a rare breed. Even the most successful writers today such as Andrew Davies or Lynda La Plante tend towards the adaptation of books or work within fixed genres such as the police or detective serial. For all their merits,&nbsp;<em>To Play the King&nbsp;</em>or&nbsp;<em>Prime Suspect&nbsp;</em>have not shaken the boundaries of what television drama can be. Anyone watching last week's BAFTA ceremonies would have heard writers constantly praised. They would have been hard-pressed, however, to spot one between the anonymous executives and famous actors gathered in Drury Lane. Appropriately, the awards for Best Drama Series and Best Single Drama, won by&nbsp;<em>Between<a name="QuickMark"></a>&nbsp;the Lines&nbsp;</em>and&nbsp;<em>Safe,</em>&nbsp;were collected by the programme producers.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">Here I must declare an interest: a lurking desire to fluff a BAFTA acceptance speech. Having written for stage, radio and print, I know that TV writing is one of the least respected forms. I also believe that, in technical terms, it is one of the most demanding. The closeness of the camera shows up any falsity of dialogue or character. Meaning has to be conveyed in action and, though it remains unseen, a good script should read like a good novel, the visual storytelling and&nbsp;<em>mise-en-scène</em>&nbsp;setting the rhythm for everything the actors and directors do. Despite this, in financial terms, the writer is near the bottom of the heap. TV drama costs about half a million pounds an hour and the script is usually a small fraction of the budget. Writers can be jettisoned at relatively little expense, while an aberrant director or star can lose millions.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">This leads to a strange twilight existence for TV writers: long bouts of waiting-around interspersed with moments of panic. Over the last five years I've 'developed' six original screenplays or pilots. These I've had months to polish. They represent my best work, calling cards for new commissions. All remain, largely due to external reasons, unproduced. In contrast, last minute production decisions create the opposite problem when writing for existing serials. In just over a year I've completed seven scripts - most in less than a month.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">Many blame the decline in the writer's profile on the demise of the single play. ITV has almost entirely dispensed with one-off dramas, and the BBC has transmuted them into high cost, director-led, producer-controlled 'screenplays'. When Potter started out, a dramatist could hone his or her skills in Armchair Theatre or Play for Today at relatively little cost. Today's aspirants either have to survive years of high casualty 'development' or cut their teeth in genre formats. Whatever the merits of&nbsp;<em>The Bill,&nbsp;</em>or&nbsp;<em>Brookside&nbsp;</em>or&nbsp;<em>Casualty&nbsp;</em>they are not the ideal grounds for experiment and, increasingly, storylines are provided by script editors, storyliners, producers or executive producers. In such an environment it is easy to become just a writer of dialogue and fail to take responsibility for the entire shape of a piece.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">It would be wrong, however, to suspect a managerial conspiracy. The single play has been largely abandoned because the audience abandoned it. If the demand was there, ITV would fill its schedules with single plays (just as, if it made films the public wanted to see, the British film industry would not be in such a poor state). Besides, even in its heyday the studio drama was a strange hybrid between stage and film. Series such as&nbsp;<em>Z-Cars</em>nurtured as much writing talent and the most original television writing has been in serial form. In Potter's case, his two greatest achievements to date are both serials,&nbsp;<em>Pennies from Heaven&nbsp;</em>and - still unsurpassed for narrative brilliance -&nbsp;<em>The Singing Detective.</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">Television's great dramatic innovation has been the series or the serial (who cares which - most the audience don't). The recurrent slot, the sense of development and repetition, is unique to the form. Trevor Preston<em>&nbsp;</em>has called the series the 'television novel' and to this extent Andrew Davies&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">is&nbsp;</span>the best contemporary representative of George Eliot. The popularity of the Victorian novel, with queues forming for the latest weekly instalment of Dickens in&nbsp;<em>Household Words,</em>&nbsp;is much closer to Shepherd's Bush than Bloomsbury.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">But the novel is a solitary form and drama, by definition, is collaborative. For every new Alan Bennett, Bleasdale, or Debbie Horsfield, are ten dramas whose authorship is unknown or dispersed among many. This needn't necessarily dilute the quality. Both&nbsp;<em>Morse&nbsp;</em>and&nbsp;<em>Cracker&nbsp;</em>owe their origin to a number of hands and in America, where authorship is even more nebulous, team writing is the norm. The result is not always writing by committee. On the contrary, in recent years, imports such as&nbsp;<em>LAPD, Twin Peaks, thirtysomething,&nbsp;</em>or<em>&nbsp;Hill Street Blues&nbsp;</em>have shown more narrative innovation than home-baked material. One has to go back to&nbsp;<em>Boys from the Blackstuff&nbsp;</em>or&nbsp;<em>Edge of Darkness&nbsp;</em>to find a British series at the cutting edge, changing the way we tell our stories as well as the stories we tell.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">When people complain about the decline in television authorship, therefore, they actually bemoaning a general lack of originality and invention. Budget and production values may have increased, but so too have the number of formulaic lego-built dramas. This sense of sameness and caution is not a mystery. It has a simple explanation: the massive concentration of commissioning power in a few hands.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">Despite the flourishing of independent companies in the 1980s, the apparent diversity conceals a sharp and disturbing centralisation. You may now devise a project with any number of small companies, but it can only be given the go-ahead by an decreasing circle of people. The base has widened, but so have the decision-making layers, each layer trying to second guess what the one above will say. At the top, the pyramid has become almost perfect. The decision what millions will watch every week is effectively taken by only four men.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">In any other industry this structure would come in for some kind of investigation. No matter how brilliant these four men are, how broad their minds, diverse their tastes, such a funnelling of the cultural power must be inhibiting. Ironically, it was the Office of Fair Trading that imposed the central commissioning and scheduling Network Centre on ITV. The BBC has no such excuse. Ever since&nbsp;<em>El Dorado&nbsp;</em>drama has been make or break for BBC controllers so both Yentob and Jackson patrol the commissioning process ferociously. Like cold war enemies locked in combat, BBC and ITV have begun to resemble each other with the same mad monolithic structures.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">In this climate, authorship, like authority, is the prerequisite of a few. How can writers feel responsible for their work when producers, their executive producers, even their heads of department can't feel responsible? Like so many other apparent 'reforms' in health and education, deregulation in Television has disguised an increase in control from the centre. Perhaps it's a perverse tribute to the cultural importance a writer like Dennis Potter gave to the medium that the government has done so much to stifle it. But it's a tribute we can do without.</p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>Culture and Arts</category>
			<pubDate>Sat, 27 May 1995 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>This is What Austerity Looks Like: Riots in North London</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/blogs/item/141-this-is-what-austerity-looks-like-riots-in-north-london</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/blogs/item/141-this-is-what-austerity-looks-like-riots-in-north-london</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="K2FeedIntroText"><p>It's been 26 years since I last remember police cars speeding up my road to the riots at <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broadwater_Farm_riot">the Broadwater Farm estate in North London</a>. Then - just like last night - <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/05/man-shot-police-london-arrest">a policing incident</a> had been the spark that ignited latent social and political tensions that had been building for years. The previous Tottenham riot wasn't an isolated incident: prior to that there had been riots in Brixton in South London, Toxteth in Liverpool, and Handsworth in Birmingham. <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/gallery/2011/aug/07/tottenham-hit-by-riots-pictures?CMP=twt_gu#/?picture=377652661&amp;index=12">And last night the same scenes returned to my beloved city.</a></p>
<p><img src="http://i39.photobucket.com/albums/e199/peterjukes/motley%20moose/Shooting-in-Tottenham-Hal-001.jpg" alt="" width="550" />&nbsp;</p>
</div><div class="K2FeedFullText">
<p>Such looting and violence is never justifiable. When it happens in the poorer neighbourhoods, it's exactly those who can least afford to cope with it who have to deal with the carnage and aftermath - the closed shops, heavy police presence, the sense of fear and the smell of charred buildings. Fortunately no one seems to have been seriously injured last night; but looting is not a legitimate form of wealth redistribution. <img style="margin: 7px;" src="http://i39.photobucket.com/albums/e199/peterjukes/motley%20moose/A-woman-and-her-child-wal-008.jpg" alt="" width="550" />&nbsp;But apart from the moral or legal condemnations, what are the connections between the riots last night and the 1980s when these were almost a regular occurence? Surely, beyond individual morality or neighbour policing there is a clear cut connection... <strong>We've returned to the 1980s agenda of Thatcherism: public service, benefit cuts and unemployment, with all the social consequences that follow</strong></p>
<h2>"There Will Be Riots"</h2>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<p>There are many factors which made this summer of trouble foreseeable. Beyond and above the world recession, the key factor provoking trouble across Europe, especially in Greece, has been the sudden removal of benefits and social support for the poorest segments of society. For all its faults, New Labour fought long and hard to provide investment, infrastructure, training and income support for excluded groups, especially young black men in the inner cities. Britain in the twenty years since Thatcherism and <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/bbc_parliament/3631579.stm">the Scarman report on the Brixton riots</a> paid special attention to job opportunities, youth activities and support for the most excluded parts of society. But since last year the Coalition Government enabled, in its Comprehensive Spending Review, <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/10/31/915546/-GOTV:-You-think-YOURE-screwed-A-Cautionary-Tale-from-Britain?via=blog_495616">the biggest cuts in public expenditure in 70 years</a>, underprivileged youth has been particularly hit, as the video below - made before the riots - makes amply clear
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As the speaker at the end says:</p>
<blockquote>"There will be Riots"</blockquote>
<p>A year ago I pointed out how unequally the austerity measures were hitting different sections of society:</p>
<blockquote>The revered Institute of Fiscal Studies calculates t<strong>he bottom 10% will, on average, lose about 5.5% of their net income compared to roughly 4.5% for the top 10%.</strong> Let us remember that the 5.5 per cent cut will affect people on very tight budgets, who can barely feed themselves healthily. Whereas the cuts on the top 10 per cent will result in fewer luxuries being bought.</blockquote>
<p>So those Chickens are coming home to roost. It's not condoning criminal activity to show how economic austerity has social consequences. Indeed it would be immoral NOT to point it out. And the factors here are obvious. 1. A massive rise in Youth Unemployment 2. The Closure of facilities for young people 3. The Removal of the EMA grant which have 16-18 years a weekly sum for remaining in education. 4. A rise in VAT (sales taxes) and energy price hikes If the Brixton or Poll Tax Riots are anything to go by, there's a good chance this event will stir the government into realising how their economic policies are fomenting social unrest. We don't have a Tea Party here, and the Coalition - weakened by the Murdoch scandal - will probably not be able to pursue its destructive austerity measures. And if you think your deficit cutting is bad, just compare it with ours <img src="http://i39.photobucket.com/albums/e199/peterjukes/motley%20moose/Deficit-reduction-by-year_31963_image0011.png" alt="" /></p>
<h2>Back to the Future: A Recipe for Trouble</h2>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<p>London is generally a peaceful safe city. I live in the centre, and - as I told American friends visiting yesterday - I rarely fear walking in any of its streets. But in the last few weeks, as the school holidays have arrived, I have noticed more bored teenagers roaming around. Their job prospects are poor to non existent. Their grants have been cut. Their youth centres closed. Many have parents who are stressed trying to manage the rising prices and decreasing incomes or depressed thanks to unemployment, and probably having to leave the city because of the cap in housing benefit. How can one assume than you treat the poorest 5 per cent like this with impunity? When kids are bored, depressed, hopeless - that's a recipe for trouble. Though no one would admit the economic connections with rioting in the 80s, the Thatcher government commissioned the Scarman report that did conclude economic prospects had a great deal of impact on social cohesion and law and order. I wonder how long it will take politicians to catch up with the past.</p>
<p><span class="update"><strong> 3:26 PM PT</strong>:</span> 1, More on the police shooting. It seems the bullet lodged in the policeman's radio during the fatal shooting of Mark Duggan last night was police issue.</p>
<p>2. Things are like 1985, but also very different in Tottenham</p>
<p>The television producer and commentator<br /> <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/blog/2011/aug/07/tottenham-riots-police-duggan-live">David Akinsanya</a> was in Tottenham in the early hours of Sunday morning. He also covered some of the 1980s riots as a reporter.</p>
<blockquote>"There are and there aren't similarities between what happened and earlier riots. In those days as a black youth you could be walking down the street, the police would bundle you into a van and nobody would see you for three days. That doesn't happen now. The black community is asking the police to get on top of gun crime, that's another change</blockquote>
<p>And here's David Lammy, the MP for the consituency, giving his take on how this differs from the 80s.</p>
<p>
<object data="http://www.youtube.com/v/AoI4QacdyYw?http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fv%2FAoI4QacdyYw=undefined&amp;hl=en_US&amp;feature=player_embedded&amp;version=3" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" width="550" height="335"><param name="wmode" value="opaque" /><param name="allowfullscreen" value="true" /><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/AoI4QacdyYw?http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fv%2FAoI4QacdyYw=undefined&amp;hl=en_US&amp;feature=player_embedded&amp;version=3" /></object>
</p>
<p>And not, neither he, Diane Abbott, Trevor Philips nor the other senior Black politicians in London who have spoken in these terms UK equivalents to Cornel West.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Originally posted on <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/08/07/1004145/-This-is-What-Austerity-Looks-Like:-Riots-in-North-London">Daily Kos</a> and other blogs</em></p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>Blogs</category>
			<pubDate>Sun, 07 Aug 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Libya is not Iraq: Three Victories in Tripoli</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/blogs/item/140-libya-is-not-iraq-three-victories-in-tripoli</link>
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			<description><![CDATA[<div class="K2FeedIntroText"><p>As is often noted, we all have a tendency to fight the previous war. Just as the 'quagmire' of Vietnam led to reluctance to intervene in Bosnia (at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives), so too the successes of Kosovo led to the peremptory and ill planned interventionism of Iraq. <strong>But Libya is not Iraq. </strong> As jubilant crowds fill Green Square, the fall of Tripoli to the rebels is a victory on many counts&nbsp;</p>
<p><img src="http://i39.photobucket.com/albums/e199/peterjukes/motley%20moose/201182115252357734_8.jpg" style="margin: 7px;" /></p>
<h2></div><div class="K2FeedFullText">A Victory for the Libyan People</h2>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<p>The revolutions in the Mashriq and Maghreb were not inspired by sleeper cells or CIA plotting. They were the spontaneous cry from the street. And on the night when the crowds are filling the streets of Tripoli, taking back their city, let us both celebrate their joy, and remember the many brave men and women who have lost their lives. <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/03/21/958315/-Cheering-People-Dying-Or-Spring-Movements">Back in March</a>, one of the figures who inspired me to believe in the Libyan people's struggle, and to support the Nato led intervention, was a young brilliant man, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Nabbous">Mohammed Nabbous</a>.</p>
<blockquote><b>The Voices from the Street</b> One of those I've been listening to is the brave young journalist from Benghazi, Mohammed Nabbous, an important figure in the February 17th Revolution, who ran his own website <a href="http://www.livestream.com/libya17feb"> Libya Alhurra</a>. ' Here's one of his messages "Tell the World"</blockquote>
<p><object width="550" height="335" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" data="http://www.youtube.com/v/UyIyz44oKQQ?http%253A%252F%252Fwww.youtube.com%252Fv%252FUyIyz44oKQQ=undefined&amp;hl=en_GB&amp;feature=player_embedded&amp;version=3"><param name="wmode" value="opaque" /><param name="allowfullscreen" value="true" /><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/UyIyz44oKQQ?http%253A%252F%252Fwww.youtube.com%252Fv%252FUyIyz44oKQQ=undefined&amp;hl=en_GB&amp;feature=player_embedded&amp;version=3" /></object></p>
<blockquote>'Mo' as he was known, with his perfect slightly Oxbridge inflected English, was a champion of democracy. He stayed up <a href="http://www.facebook.com/home.php?sk=group_198172636872459¬if_t=group_activity">night and day</a> to inform the world about the repressions going on in his homeland. He became a victim of those same forces when he was shot dead by Gaddafi's snipers in Benghazi yesterday, leaving a widow and an unborn child. Below is the devastating soundtrack of his last ever report by phone. Someone who risked and lost his life in the service of transparency and truth</blockquote>
<p><object width="550" height="335" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" data="http://www.youtube.com/v/Ecu_iWLn-rg?fs=1&amp;hl=en_GB"><param name="wmode" value="opaque" /><param name="allowfullscreen" value="true" /><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/Ecu_iWLn-rg?fs=1&amp;hl=en_GB" /></object></p>
<p>Mo's memory has been vindicated tonight. Thanks to <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/comment/1009270/42982024#c130">Lawrence below</a>&nbsp;in the comments for this update:</p>
<blockquote>Thank you so much for writing about Mo. (2+ / 0-) He has been on my mind all weekend. So has his wife Perditta, and his beautiful daughter Maya, whom he tragically never had the pleasure of getting to know. I would like to add a video here that is dedicated to Mo by his wife:</blockquote>
<p><iframe src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/jKQ0vsvszfM" allowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0" width="550" height="339"></iframe></p>
<p>Above all, tonight is a victory for the Libyan people, people like Mo, who risked so much, and lost so much, taking on a fearsome dictatorship, with a massive arsenal and all the apparatus of secret police, false imprisonement and torture accumulated over 40 years. They've carried the same chant in Arabic that has been heard in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria.</p>
<blockquote>"The people want the fall of the regime"</blockquote>
<h2>A Victory for Responsibility to Protect and International Law</h2>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<p>Encouraged by the Arab League, and against the wishes of many dictators in the area, the UK, France and the US (mainly led by Samantha Power and Hilary Clinton) pushed for multilateral intervention in March - as Benghazi was about to be overrun by Gaddafi's truth - on the carefully crafted and proportionate <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect">Responsibility to Protect </a>Doctrine, ratified by the UN in 2009</p>
<blockquote>1. Principle One stresses that States have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (mass atrocities). 2. Principle Two addresses the commitment of the international community to provide assistance to States in building capacity to protect their populations from mass atrocities and to assisting those, which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 3. Principle Three focuses on the responsibility of international community to take timely and decisive action to prevent and halt mass atrocities when a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations</blockquote>
<p>Though the apparent success of the Libyan intervention helps to remove the stain of the Iraq fiasco from our recent history, it does set down a precedent. You cannot murder the citizens of your own country en masse with impunity. Security Council Resolution 1973 was the first time this principle underpinned a military intervention. <strong>BREAKING: Saif Gaddafi is reported arrested, and hopefull will be handed over to the ICC to meet the same fate as Milosevic, Karadzic and Mladic in the Hague. </strong>I hope the same fate befalls his father. That would be another victory for international law and the UN.</p>
<h2>A Victory for Post Intervention Planning</h2>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<p>Over the long six month campaign, many things have been going on in the background, beyond the air campaign. There have been furious negotiations behind the scenes, with the transitional government, and figures from previous regimes, but another thing that <strong>makes this so different from Iraq </strong>is the level of post conflict planning that has gone on. The Australian was one of the few papers to cover the details of this</p>
<blockquote><a href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/iraq-haunts-plans-for-post-gaddafi-libya/story-e6frg6so-1226111211251">Iraq haunts plans for post-Gaddafi Libya</a> WESTERN governments have helped prepare a blueprint for a post-Gaddafi Libya that would retain much of the regime's security infrastructure to avoid an Iraq-style collapse into anarchy. The 70-page plan, obtained by London's The Times, charts the first months after the fall of the Gaddafi regime. The document was drawn up by the National Transition Council in Benghazi with Western help. Officials say the blueprint draws on lessons from the disastrous regime change in Iraq in 2003 and the rebel takeover in eastern Libya in March. The plans are highly reliant on the defection of parts of the Gaddafi security apparatus to the rebels after his overthrow. This is likely to prove not only risky, but controversial, with many rebel fighters determined to sweep away all vestiges of the regime. The document includes proposals for a 10,000-15,000 strong "Tripoli task force", resourced and supported by the United Arab Emirates, to take over the Libyan capital, secure key sites and arrest high-level Gaddafi supporters. It claims 800 serving Gaddafi government security officials have been recruited covertly to the rebel cause and are ready to form the "backbone" of a new security apparatus. The blueprint contains plans for about 5000 police officers now serving in units not ideologically committed to the Gaddafi regime to be transferred immediately to the interim government's forces to prevent a security vacuum.</blockquote>
<p>The TMC has also drawn up an impeccably liberal constitution: freedom of the press, of religion, protection of minorities and civil rights. <strong>Rarely has a revolutionary movement come to power with such a thought through approach to the future.</strong> If this is true, expect to see the tremendous scenes of celebration in Tripoli ending up very differently to scenes in Baghdad eight years ago.</p>
<p>From <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/08/21/1009270/-Libya-is-not-Iraq:-Three-Victories-in-Tripoli">DailyKos</a>: Also published on Motley Moose and <a href="http://www.labourlist.org/a-triple-victory-in-tripoli">Labourlist</a></p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>Blogs</category>
			<pubDate>Mon, 22 Aug 2011 21:04:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>What Norway's Terror Teaches us about Islamophobia and Online Hate</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/history-a-ideas/item/139-what-norways-terror-teaches-us-about-islamophobia-and-online-hate</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/history-a-ideas/item/139-what-norways-terror-teaches-us-about-islamophobia-and-online-hate</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="K2FeedIntroText"><p><br /><img style="float: left; margin: 7px;" src="http://www.labourlist.org/uploads/0162e6cb-99a9-af94-8146-bcbab0b6f09e.jpg" alt="" width="300" />If there’s any shred of comfort that come come from the horrors of ten days ago, the bomb attacks in Oslo and massacre of dozens of teenagers in Utøya, it is scant consolation for bereft families or a nation in mourning. The biggest atrocity on Norwegian soil since World War II, and one of the biggest terrorist incidents in Europe in decades, is no occasion for political point scoring. But some good may yet come out of it: the full glare of public scrutiny (and one hopes police attention) has now been turned on the largely ignored growth of extreme right-wing Islamophobia in Europe.</p>
<p>(From <a href="http://www.motleymoose.com/diary/3201/islamophobia-the-cleansing-effect-of-daylight">Motley Moose</a> blog: This was a draft of an Essay that Appeared on <a href="http://www.labourlist.org/islamophobia-and-online-hate;">Labour List</a>&nbsp;and Daily Kos)&nbsp;</p>
</div><div class="K2FeedFullText">
<p>Nearly exactly a year ago, I wrote how Obama had bravely faced up to the Islamophobes in the US during his &lt;a href=<a href="http://www.labourlist.org/obama-and-islamophobia&gt;">http://www.labourlist.org/obama-and-islamophobia&gt;</a>;Ramadan speech&lt;/a&gt; and worried that Europe lacked such leadership.</p>
<p>&lt;blockquote&gt;The rise of Islamophobia in Europe over the last few years - expression of which I have encountered many times in the past, even on LabourList, - has filled me with a kind a foreboding I haven't felt since the early 90s and the rabid nationalism in former-Yugoslavia, which itself had an anti-Muslim component.</p>
<p>The signs are everywhere to be seen. The US have Palin's 'Ground Zero Mosque' and the threat of Koran burning. We have the French assembly voting to ban niqab, Switzerland banning minarets, and the rise of the English Defence League here in the UK, deliberately targeting Muslim communities with provocation and violence...</p>
<p>We have demagogues like Geert Wilders in Holland getting 33% of the vote by inciting fear and hatred. Meanwhile, opportunist politicians in the UK try to ride the bandwagon, putting forward legislation to ban burkas. This is hardly helped by so-called intellectuals (who should know better) talking about 'Islamofascism' or "Londonistan" and trying to yolk together a religion of universalist appeal with racist ultranationalism.&lt;/blockquote&gt;</p>
<p>Don't worry. This is not some gratuitous exercise in 'I told you so'. My hands are no cleaner than others, and in the rise of Islamophobia I have to share some blame (&lt;i&gt;more below&lt;/i&gt;). We do not know yet if Anders Behring Breivik acted entirely alone. He may yet win an insanity defence. Yet there's little doubt that both his targets and his motivation were avowedly &lt;b&gt;political&lt;/b&gt;. Both &lt;a href=<a href="http://youtu.be/rAwp2FnRmsE&gt;">http://youtu.be/rAwp2FnRmsE&gt;</a>;the video he uploaded&lt;/a&gt; and the &lt;a href="http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/<a href="http://www.kevinislaughter.com/wp-content/uploads/2083+-+A+European+Declaration+of+Independence.pdf&quot;">http://www.kevinislaughter.com/wp-content/uploads/2083+-+A+European+Declaration+of+Independence.pdf"</a>;&gt;European Manifesto of Independence&lt;/a&gt; he passed on to sympathisers should place that beyond doubt Though somewhat rambling and derivative, Breivik's arguments are rational and coherent. He articulates a vision of the 'Islamisation of Europe', deliberately smuggled in by Marxists spouting 'multiculturalism' as their credo. That vision, and his belief that an incendiary act of violence was needed to trigger the inevitable religious and social conflict make it indisputable: the killings on Friday 21st of July &lt;b&gt;a classic act of political terrorism.&lt;/b&gt;</p>
<p>Like many young men who search for some final battle between good and evil, Breivik was a dreamer of the absolute, who found his purpose in sacrificing himself for a cause greater than himself. In this, he resembles the extremist Jihadists he purports to despise, and like many of them, he seems to have been indoctrinated and then motivated into a medieval mindset through a quite modern source: what he read &lt;i&gt;online&lt;/i&gt;.</p>
<h1>Does the Blogosphere Breed Political Hate?</h1>
<p>The more that emerges about Breivart's relatively affluent and quiet background in Norway, the more investigators search for the sources of his warped worldview, the more abundantly obvious it is that <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/30/norway-attacks-anders-behring-breivik">online conversations with British extremists were a key source of ideology and inspiration</a>. This has led Nick Cohen to assert, in yesterday's Observer, that <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/31/rightwing-extremism-breivik-islam">Britain is the Breeding Ground for Hate</a></p>
<blockquote>Nothing about Breivik is as interesting as the people he shot, but those with the stomach to read him will find that ideas made in Britain enthralled him. He writes in English. He uses a British pseudonym – Andrew Berwick – and gives his manifesto a London dateline. He meets sympathisers in a London pub and drops strong hints that the organisation he is closest to is the English Defence League. He has a respect for at least some of the EDL's ideas because it does not go along with traditional antisemitic Nazism but agrees with Breivik that there has been a plot by the treacherous "cultural Marxists" of the European elite to undermine the nation state by flooding it with immigrants, most notably Muslim immigrants. British extremists of whatever type have the advantage that English is the language of the web that foreigners must master if they want an international audience. Breivik's references to British sources would not be surprising if all he did was quote from obscure websites and chatrooms. But Breivik did not only listen to British far rightists screaming out their hatreds in the madhouses of the blogosphere, but peppered his manifesto with citations of articles in the Daily Telegraph and other respectable conservative newspapers. Britain's mainstream media, not the fringe on the web, formed the basis of his claim that readers could find all the evidence they need of the multicultural plot to turn white, Christian Europe into a Muslim-dominated "Eurabia"</blockquote>
<p>As usual, Cohen is right about the detail but jumps to a debatable conclusion. When it comes to displaying knee-jerk suspicions of Islam, it wasn't just Murdoch's <em>The Sun</em> who assumed the Oslo attacks were Jihadist in origin: even the liberal <em>New York Times</em> jumped the gun and wheeled out its bloviating Al Qaeda experts. There's also no doubt the English speaking political blogosphere is full of cocoons of craziness and hatred. Outbursts of Islamophobia can be found anywhere. But so too can unfounded claims about Climate Change, the EU(SSR), Obama's birth certificate, or the CIA's involvement in the 9/11 attacks. It's not just on the xenophobic right where echo chambers of extremism flourish. As a regular blogger in the US, I encounter conspiracy theories and apocalyptic thinking regularly on the left too - on liberal blogs like Firedoglake or Dailykos. The internet is still dominated by the English language, and so the growth of extremist rhetoric could be something to do with the nature of politics online. Because you preselect your sites and sources - <strong>narrowcasting </strong>rather than <strong>broadcasting </strong>- the net brings the attendant dangers of confirmation bias, and a ramped up atmosphere of increasing hyperbole and extremism of expression. However, as my own experience reveals, blogging has forced me to engage with, and try to combat, generalised arguments about Muslims, Birthers, Climate Change, or the EU. Why didn't Breivik's online excursions lead him him to <em>The Guardian</em> or indeed <em>Labourlist,</em> where his ideas would have been challenged? Short answer: they probably did. But he didn't listen. The internet didn’t create extremism. It might have amplified on some occasions. But there are other example of new media - from the Murdoch scandal to the Arab Spring - where online activism has served more liberal ends. The net is basically a neutral space to share opinions. And when it comes to the recent phenomenon of Islamophobia, those opinions predate <em>Twitter </em>or <em>Comment is Free. </em></p>
<h1>A Brief History of Modern Islamophobia</h1>
<p>I'm just back from Sarajevo where the scars of the siege are still visible fifteen years later: the sniper bullet-holes in the buildings, the horrible dragon's claw mark of a mortar shell, not to mention the look in the eyes of men my age. The cataclysmic Twentieth Century was effectively launched by a bullet fired in Sarajevo in 1914 - the assassination by a Serb Nationalist of Archduke Ferdinand - and it's hard not to hear the echo of that shot in the way the century ended: the crump of a shell in the Old Town marketplace, followed finally by the first ever NATO bombs dropped in anger, as planes took out the Bosnian Serb positions around the besieged city. Just as modern Jihadism in the form of Al Qaeda came out of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, so too I believe Modern Islamophobia was born from the end of the Cold War (for its older incarnation check out Edward Said's <em>Orientalism</em>). The same year the Cold War ended was the same year that Ayatollah Khomeni issued his fatwa against Salman Rushdie for his <em>Satanic Verses</em> - 1989. For many liberal intellectuals, this was a sobering moment. Just as the Berlin Wall was coming down, another was erecting itself in people’s minds. Instead of Communism, perhaps religion - particularly fundamentalist religion - was emerging as the new enemy. Many thinkers turned their eyes from the dissidents fighting totalitarian repression in the Warsaw pact, and to the autocratic Arab states in the Middle East. Meanwhile, though hidden under the rock of Communism for decades, nationalist and xenophobic feelings emerged intact in much of Central and Eastern Europe. By now we all know about the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia, and the ultimate direction of the nationalist rhetoric of the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Though he played on fears of the Croatian Catholic Ustashe, his initial line in the sand in Kosovo was against the 'Turks'. In his famous address on the 'Battlefield of the Blackbirds' Milosevic invoked the historic role of Serbs as the defenders of Europe against the Islamic horde. This toxic religious nationalism culminated in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and the final horror of Srebenica, when 8,000 men and boys were massacred and buried in mass graves merely because they were designated 'Muslim'. We're less familiar however, with Islamophobia in the former republics of the USSR. Apart from countless terror attacks in Russia itself, there have been two wars in Chechyna, and other ethnically-based conflicts in other former Soviet Republics, including that of my grandfather's homeland - Armenia - which was engaged in brutal conflict with Azerbaijan over Ngorno Karabakh. Meanwhile, anyone from the Caucasus (whatever their religious denomination) still faces danger in Russia itself. When I was in Yerevan three years ago I met a sculptor - barely darker than I am - who had fled St Petersburg because a friend had been stabbed to death for being too Islamic looking. It's impossible - or at least very difficult - to remove the <em>racial component</em> from Islamophobia. Though no one would recognise my Bosniak or Kosovar friends as Muslim when they walk down the street, the truth is, for most of Europe, Muslims are recognisable by their colour as much as what they wear or what beards they sport. So there's an underlying racist component to Islamophobia, and groups like the EDL (despite having a Sikh among their leadership) exploit this to the full. They say they're not racists. What they object to is <strong>fundamentalist religion</strong> - and who can object to that? But as anyone who has shared a bus with EDL supporters will attest, this racialist disclaimer is a lie. They're the same old hooligans, Paki-bashers and Nazi bully boys I recall from the 70s and 80s. But intellectually, they draw some cover from surprising sources. I remember Senior Tories, while debating why Britain shouldn't do anything in Bosnia, explaining how Islam would be the next major global struggle after defeating Communism. In this they were merely reiterating what Sam Huntingdon described in his <em>Clash of Civilisations</em>: a new conflict, a New World Order, pitting liberal values against against the intolerance of an unreformed Islam. Unfortunately, this kind of apologia was also echoed on the New Left who mourned the death of non-aligned Socialism, and saw the West 'manufacturing consensus' for intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo. They also doubted the camps in Omarska and wondered whether Srebrenica was really an act of genocide and not 'exaggerated'. Some of them formed a Committee in Defence of Milosevic. Islamisation was, to some, the secret plan of Western capitalism to destroy actually existing socialism. Add to this already toxic mix the slow-burning Intifadas in Israel's occupied territories, Hamas suicide bombers, Likudite obstructionism after the assassination of Rabin, and a perfect storm was brewing.... Then 9/11 came along. After the mind-shattering attacks on the World Trade Centre all nuance was lost. The enemy was blindingly clear: the death-loving, mass-murdering, medieval fundamentalism of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. In hindsight this traumatic over-reaction was probably inevitable. Gone was the characterisation of Islam as a multifaceted religion of 1.6 billion adherents, with its own major schisms between Sunni and Shia, or Alawites, Ismailis or Sufis. Everyone - TV pundits, newspaper columnists, novelists, playwrights - became experts on the extreme doctrine of Salafist Wahabis. The backlash was set.... For different motives, some of them almost honourable, modern Islamophobia grew out of a strange confluence of four very different currents; old fashioned xenophobic racism, atheist anti-clericalism, socialist nostalgia, and a Neo-con belief in reshaping the Middle East. When future historians ponder the fiasco of the Iraq War, the horrors of Abu Ghraib, or indeed the over reach of the initial policing operation in Afghanistan, I'm sure conclude they will conclude that for several years Osama Bin Laden achieved his objectives. After all, that's what the 9/11 attacks were meant to provoke: a massive over-reaction by the West which would lead to more polarisation, more Muslims being driven into Al Qaeda's arms when the realised the tolerance of western liberal democracy was fake, and we are all Covert Crusaders. We almost played straight into his hands. But not quite. And that's why the battle against Islamophobia is as crucial to our own security as the battle against Salafist Jihadism.</p>
<h1>Is Multiculturalism to Blame?</h1>
<p>Let us not forget, though there were numerous young Muslims at the Utøya summer camp, Breivik's target wasn't a mosque or the small Norwegian Muslim community, but what he considered their 'Marxist' enablers; young members of the ruling Labour Party, who were using 'multiculturalism' as a back door for the secret destruction of Christendom. It's a completely illogical belief: why would Marxists pretend to be social democrats to ally with Fundamentalist Islam to destroy Christianity? But it's not unheard of in the UK, and on these boards I've argued with commenters who claim that Labour deliberately 'swamped' the UK with Muslim immigrants in the rush for more votes. Despite the crazy conspiracies, Breivik's hatred of multi-culturalism is a popular them among far right parties in Austria, Holland. Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark. For the most part, especially in the Scandinavian countries, these are relatively small ethnically homogenous states and aren't multi-cultural at all. But that doesn't seem to stop them worrying about it. Unfortunately, in the last year, the 'multi culturalism' canard has been echoed by leaders of two of the largest countries in the EU: Angela Merkel in Germany and David Cameron here. As the Nobel Chair and former Norwegian Prime Minister Thorbjørn Jagland has suggested, they could be <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jul/30/david-cameron-far-right-nobel-warning">"playing with fire"</a></p>
<blockquote>Four months ago in Munich, Cameron declared that state multiculturalism had failed in Britain, a view immediately praised by Nick Griffin, leader of the BNP, as "a further huge leap for our ideas into the political mainstream". Marine Le Pen, vice-president of the far-right National Front party in France, also endorsed Cameron's view of multiculturalism, claiming that it corroborated her own party's line.
<blockquote>"Political leaders have got to defend the fact that society has become more diverse. We have to defend the reality, otherwise we are going to get into a mess. I think political leaders have to send a clear message to embrace it and benefit from it. "We should be very cautious now, we should not play with fire. Therefore I think the words we are using are very important because it can lead to much more."</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<p>Though I think Cameron's speech was ill-advised, and a bit of a sop to the Tory right, I don't he can be at all blamed for the atrocity in Norway ten days ago. Indeed, Breivik discussed Cameron as one of his targets. I also don't think that debating 'multiculturalism' is inflammatory in itself. The problem is - as I'm willing to debate - that the term means many different things. In most of Central Europe, Multi-Kulti was a policy to deal with historic minorities of Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles etc left over from the decay of three empires, and not yet cleansed by either Hitler or Stalin. As the Former Yugoslavia shows, that policy of effective segregation was neither stable nor enlightened. When Merkel uses the term 'multi-culturalism' she is part adverting to this, and arguing in favour of rights for long-standing children and grand-children of Turkish gastarbeiter (guest workers) who under the old blood-line form of German citizenship didn't have status, (though an ethnic German from the Russian Volga would). Merkel's attack on multi culturalism is partly an attack on and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jus_sanguinis">Jus sanguinis</a> and a defence of integration. However, when David Cameron used the same language, he was kicking a giant strawman. Multi culturalism has never been Government policy here and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jus_soli"> Jus soli</a> - place of birth - has generally determined citizenship. In terms of civil rights, immigration, housing and cultural policy, Britain has generally followed a path of integration, or - as David Goodhart would argue in recent years - no plan at all. Apart from the unfortunate exception of the former Mill Towns of the north, most our cities are heavily integrated compared to Rotterdam, Brussels, Paris or Berlin. No doubt much more needs to be done, but I know of no-one in the Labour Party, even during left separatist sections in the 80s, ever argue for the policy of segregationalist multi-culturalism. Since the overwhelming majority of our Muslim population are now first or second or even third generation, the question of current immigration hardly solves this point either. <em>And let us not forget, Britain has been for three hundred years a multi-national, mult-ethnic and multi-denominational nation.</em> There will be and always has been a problem between communities. But yolking together, as Cameron did, the problem of Islamic extremist and multiculturalism, is just a bit of short term blindness. Throughout my youth, the problems of integration had nothing to do with religion, unless someone wants to argue the riots in Handsworth, Toxteth, Brixton, St Pauls or Tottenham were a problem of fundamentalist Rastafarianism. Whatever the issues today in Tower Hamlets and Bow, a hundred years ago the press was filled with similar stories of terrorists and anarchists in the East End. These new immigrants dressed strangely, spoke incomprehensibly, ate weird food, and followed disturbing religious practices with their own 'laws'. It was fashionable to denounce them, in newspapers, novels, even in Nobel prize winning poetry. To many their presence in Britain was a huge threat to our way of life and security. Many inveighed against the tolerance of the government, their kowtowing to extremism. Things got so bad that fear of these strange co-religionists and their conspiracies ignited a Europe-wide movement. The tension finally erupted into major street violence, as those who opposed fundamentalist religion marched through the East End... This of course was march of Mosley's Black Shirts in 1936 and their routing at the Battle of Cable Street. These strange and alien people were Ashkenazi Jews, who had fled pogroms in Lithuania, Poland and other dominions of the Tsarist Empire and arrived in London in their hundreds of thousands at the end of the 19th Century. Anti-semitic fascism was stopped in its tracks in London that day in 1936, though it raged unabated in Europe for another ten years, leading to the destruction of Central European Jewry and the ultimate horror of the Holocaust. Though feared a century ago, in many ways redolent of the language to describe Muslims in the UK today, we now see the influx of Jews into this country not as a social problem, but a huge boost to the intellectual, social and economic life of our nation. <em>If 'multiculturalism' means this, the British history of religious and ethnic tolerance, of rejecting faith or raced based hatred as a political program, then what's wrong with it? Let me sign up.</em></p>
<h1>How do We Fight It? And How I Went Wrong</h1>
<p>For all that fighting talk, I don't actually think - especially since the modern channels of communication are more virtual - that street battles are the way to go in combating Islamophobia. Just as it has taken root so quickly online, through ideas and theories spreading across the web, our task to to tackle them in the same way: counter the arguments whenever we find them, dispel understandable anxieties with facts, replace lies with real information, and both in ourselves and among others, look for a broader exploration about what Islam really means. As I said, concluding my essay a year ago:</p>
<blockquote>For all these reasons I believe that, left unchecked, this tide of Islamophobia could be as catastrophic for this century as Anti-semitism was in the last. It strikes at the heart of the modern nation state, which was partly created as an answer to centuries of religious warfare, and gives support to extremists and religious zealots everywhere. If we want to preserve our tolerant liberal democracy, should do all we can to expose, argue, and root out Islamophobia wherever we find it - even in our own minds.</blockquote>
<p>And this leads me to a counter-intuitive conclusion: <strong>let's welcome the Islamophobes entry into the discussion</strong>. Let's not berate them. Let's not just call them names. Islamophobia is a philosophy, a simplistic and almost appealing apocalyptic philosophy that seems to explain our confusing world. Not all of those who express these ideas have thought them through. Many have arrived at them on the basis of false evidence and misinformation. Every human on this planet has a racist side - and we're all hard-wired to look for 'out group' enemies to increase our 'in group' bonding. So banning hate speak, censoring anti Islamic statements, that will not make Islamophobia go away. We should engage with the arguments, expose the contradictions, follow the ultimately dangerous and genocidal logic. Let's shed daylight on this phenomenon, because if the experience of Bosnia teaches us anything, it just flourished buried under a rock. This is where I actually think the internet, and the Anglo Saxon tradition of liberal debate does the exact opposite of what Nick Cohen suggests: it will eventually cleanse extremism with daylight. And this is where I have to share some of the blame. When encountering anti Islamic statements, I have always tried to resist equating the sin with the sinner, making a racist comment an indication of deep and abiding racism. But I have also failed to make that distinction sometimes, and therefore made the hatred unsayable, and more likely to find its outlet in violent or nefarious ways. <em>In this debate, we should be careful to separate out the separate strands of Islamophobia from the hardcore racist element.</em> <strong>To those who fear Islam in itself</strong>, let us remind them that to characterise this vast religion by the activities of Bin Laden would be as bad as characterising Christianity by the activities of Timothy McVeigh, or Judaism by those of Baruch Goldstein, or indeed Buddhism by the killings of the Aum Shurikyro cult behind the Sarin gas attack on Tokyo. Indeed, analysing modern history by medieval standards plays into the hands of the fundamentalists who, by such simplistic standards, can rightly point out that in the last couple of decades, <em>Christians killed each other by their thousands in Northern Ireland, by their millions in Rwanda and - apart from killing Muslims in Bosnia - Christians invaded with much bloodshed the Muslim states of Kuwait, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq</em> <strong>To the Neocons</strong>, who wanted to reshape the Middle East, and who believed Arab countries were dominated by corrupt Autocrats, we can point to the positive homegrown examples of revolution in the Arab spring, the faces of hope and resilience in Tahrir Square, the continued struggles in Syria, Libya and Bahrain, and prove that Islam is not always in love with dreams of a medieval caliphate. <strong>To the militant atheists and anti-clericals</strong>, we can point out that secularism is not just a freedom from religion, but a freedom of religion, and that Britain has - since the time of Elizabeth the First - moved progressively down the road that religion is a matter for private belief, and not to be castigated or controlled by the state. Forcing people not to believe in any God would be just as bad as forcing them to believe in One God. This is the hard core of tolerance, and cannot be defended with intolerance. <strong>Finally, to the nostalgic socialists we can say</strong>: yes you had a point. Communism did manage to repress the nationalist and religious conflicts under its iron fist. But repression, censorship, banning religious symbols, closing mosques and churches, was merely a cork in a brewing bottle of venom which, when removed, exploded with even more force. The solution to all extremism is exposure: exposure to facts, opposing ideas, diversity of debate. So those who disagree with me... please start below.</p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>History &amp; Ideas</category>
			<pubDate>Mon, 01 Aug 2011 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Tony Judt: the last interview</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/interviews/item/136-tony-judt-the-last-interview</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/interviews/item/136-tony-judt-the-last-interview</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="K2FeedImage"><img src="http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/media/k2/items/cache/5d9bd784bfd234610bf8ba15e7ad6a4e_S.jpg" alt="Tony Judt: the last interview" /></div><div class="K2FeedIntroText"><p>&nbsp;</p>
<div class="standfirst">Exclusive to Prospect online, the full transcript of Peter Jukes's interview with historian and author Tony Judt</div>
<div class="lead_image"><a><img class="article_image" alt="" /></a></div>
<div class="entry"><br />
<p><strong><img style="margin: 7px;" src="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/173_arts_jukes2.jpg" alt="" width="550" /></strong></p>
<p><strong>Peter Jukes (right) with Judt (middle), 2007</strong></p>
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<p><strong>Tony Judt died, surrounded by his family, on the evening of August 6th, 2010. The New York Times obituary can be <a>read here</a>. This is the full transcript of Peter Jukes’s interview with Tony Judt—conducted earlier this year via email, due to the progress of Judt’s motor neurone disease. The full text of Jukes’s portrait of Tony Judt is featured in the August issue of <em>Prospect</em>, and can be read online <a href="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/07/tony-judt-a-man-of-his-word/">here</a>.</strong></p>
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<p><strong>Peter Jukes</strong>: I’ll start with a confession. Before we first met 12 years ago at the Remarque Forum [a conference Judt sponsored as professor of history at New York University] a joint friend of ours sent me an example of your work—a chapter I think from your 1979 book <em>Socialism in Provence 1871-1914</em>. I must admit my heart sank. I’m sure it was compelling and well documented, but it gave no indication of the liveliness and relevance of the discussion at that Forum, nor of the range of your writing. I think you must have been half way through your compendious history of the whole of post-war Europe at the time.</p>
<p>So my question is: how did you move from the micro-analysis of the French left between two wars to the often global historical issues you address today?</p>
</div><div class="K2FeedFullText">
<p><strong>Tony Judt:</strong> Remember it was a long process. I started work on my first French history book in 1969; on Socialism in Provence in 1974; and on the essays in Marxism and the French Left in 1978. Conversely, my first non-academic publication, a review in the TLS, did not come until the late 1980s, and it was not until 1993 that I published my first piece in the New York Review. So that’s a 25 year learning curve. Moreover, there was a transitional book: Past Imperfect. This was real intellectual history, but it was also a political intervention and it’s often unclear even to me which way I was leaning in any given chapter.</p>
<p>I don’t think that English historians of my generation or the immediately preceding one were incapable of the bigger picture, whether in form or content. But there was (no longer is) a deep prejudice against “popularization.” Some people did it well—Hobsbawm or Trevelyan—and many people did it badly; but there was no academic reward for it. Recall that AJP Taylor, a truly first-rate historian, diminished his reputation by spending too much time on radio and TV shows, not to mention reviews in the Beaverbrook Press. Popularizing—much less venturing beyond one’s secure turf—was frowned upon for many years. I think I probably internalized the prohibition, even though I was—and knew I was—among the best speakers and writers of my age cohort. I don’t mean I was the best historian, a quite different measure.</p>
<p><strong>PJ:</strong> Was the training you had part of the problem here, given that you took your degree and then your doctorate in Cambridge, and then wrote from a university position in France? You’ve often regretted the lack of public intellectuals in modern life—is this because of issues with modern academic systems?<br /> <strong><br /> TJ:</strong> The problem of <em>déformation professionnelle</em> is real but mostly American. It would be suicide in the American academy to show too early an interest beyond your doctoral specialization: charges of everything from charlatanry to ambition would be levied and tenure denied. I’ve seen this first-hand. This is because the American graduate school universe was created by Germans (refugees) and echoes many of the worst as well as the best features of its model: deep academic research, carefully limited range of materials, engagement in internally-referential debates and utter unconcern for the market. These are not all bad qualities—without them we would not have had some of the world’s greatest historical monographs. But they inhibit people for decades from putting their nose above a parapet. I have always loved sticking my nose about a parapet, so long as I had a decent weapon to hand. That’s partly an English trait, partly an Oxbridge trait and probably mostly a recessive Judt trait. John Dunn, my favorite King’s supervisor, once described me as “the silver-tongued orator”: a barbed compliment, since it suggested that I spoke before I thought and seduced rather than convinced, but I like it all the same.</p>
<p>The shortage of public intellectuals (in the English-speaking world) goes back to the decline of the written media: the first TV intellectual was Foucault, who was at home in both media, but his successors and imitators know only the camera. This forces sound bites upon even the most complex material: see Schama, Ferguson <em>e tutti quanti</em>. Also, and paradoxically: public intellectuals are best when they are grounded in a particular language, culture, debate. Thus Camus was French, Habermas is German, Sen is Bengali, Orwell was deep English. This made their cross-frontier ventures plausible, in the same way that Havel or Michnik today have street cred because they started out as courageous dissidents in a very particular time and place. The opposite is the ridiculous Slavoj Zizek: a “global”’ public intellectual who is therefore of no particular interest in any one place or on any one subject. If he is the future of public intellectuals, then they have no future.</p>
<p><strong>PJ:</strong> This love for sticking your nose above the parapet: is that what drew you to Israel in 1967, or Paris in 1968? You’ve written you knew you wanted to be a historian from an early age: so what made you march towards the sound of (water) cannons: the desire to be an observer or a participant?</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: I am not sure I know the answer. I never thought of Paris in 1968 as “nose above the parapet”—if anything, it was a rather conventional thing to do! Israel in 1967 was a bit different, but in that case I was following my ideological nose where it led, rather than poking it up for the sake of it. I’m not sure that I am nearly as controversial or awkward as my reputation suggests: I didn’t even drop out of high school until I had a place at King’s College, Cambridge.</p>
<p>That said, it’s true that periodically from the early 1970s through the present I have published something that put the institutional or professional noses out of joint. I think this comes from a mischievous disposition already in evidence at primary school where I was in constant trouble: a distaste for humbug, rules and undeserving authority. It may also be a result of never having been part of a school of historians but always being something of a lone wolf. And, lastly, it was clearly facilitated by early adoption into the Oxbridge elite, which bought me status and security from which to be a difficult boy.</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: Your work abjures the messianism of both the right and the left. And your latest book, <em>Ill Fares the Land</em>, emphasises this, explaining how the collapse of Communism in 1989 and the Reagan/Thatcher paradigm undermined all these narratives of a future when history would end. In a way, it’s a classic tragic vision. But somehow how, you rescue some kind optimism out of this—especially in regard to a revival of social democracy. How do you square that?</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: I see what you mean about the tragic vision. But you can’t have a tragic vision in politics—not if you wish to intervene and convince (with the exception of grand turning points, from which one should not generalize). What I am against is false optimism: the notion either that things have to go well, or else that they tend to, or else that the default condition of historical trajectories is characteristically beneficial in the long-run. I think that in order to sustain such irenic visions one has to have been born at very particular historical moments and in fortunate places. Just now I think we have very good grounds for pessimism. And as you noted, I’ve tried to write an intervention that turns pessimism into a political program rather than a despairing sceptical dismissal of all possible programs.</p>
<p>One of the very few things that I know I believe strongly is that we must learn how to make a better world out of usable pasts rather than dreaming of infinite futures. It’s a very late-Enlightenment view that says that the only way to make a better future is to believe that the future will be better. Smarter people than me used to believe very differently and I think it is time to listen to them once again.</p>
<p><strong>PJ:</strong> Before we discuss <em>Ill Fares the Land</em> in more detail, it seems to me that your decision to move to the US in 1987 was a vital transition or self translation. Not only did New York welcome “intelligent pontification,” but it gave you the distance and perspective—not to mention time and resources—to complete your vast book, <em>Postwar</em>, on modern European history.</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: All true: but we must not mix up causes and consequences. My motives for leaving Oxford in 1987 were interwoven with personal stuff (girlfriend in Stanford) and English politics: the horrible Thatcher years and the beginnings of financial and bureaucratic strangulation of higher education in the UK—the catastrophic long-term consequences of which are now becoming clear.</p>
<p>I came to New York with no particular plans to stay long term. I was attracted by the French Institute at NYU, but by the early 1990s I was already moving away from French material. Moreover, I did not do any public intellectual stuff for at least five years: my first New York Times piece was in 1990 I believe and my first NYRB essay in 1993. I nearly left the US on various occasions—offers from Oxford in 1993, Chicago in 1994, Oxford again in 1999 and more recently Princeton and EUI. But each time something about the city and the wonderful flexibility of NYU kept me back.</p>
<p>I agree on the resources: both academic and financial, which made <em>Postwar </em>possible. But above all it was the University’s willingness to let me travel and live abroad for long periods which made the book feasible. I could never have done that from Oxford. And yet, curiously, NYC felt closer to Europe than Oxford itself: more urban, more cosmopolitan, more international.</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: Yet for all that, it wasn’t long before the moeurs of US academia grated on you. I’m thinking particularly of your dislike of “cultural studies” and your rubbing up against the political correctness of identity politics.</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: I always hated that crap: I left Berkeley for Oxford in 1980 in part because of it. And things were worse a decade later. But the great thing about my independent status at NYU—and above all the independent status I insisted upon for my Institute and its activities—was that even while the pollution was rising all around us, we were free to do whatever we wanted and ignore it. I could protect students and colleagues from it, offer jobs to people who could otherwise never find them because of it, and say things that no one else dared say. For a brief while, as Humanities Dean here at NYU in the early 1990s, I was even able to push money in unconventional directions: medieval studies, minority language learning (minority here meaning Slovenian, not Cherokee), and above all build the country’s number one philosophy department, a counter-cultural achievement of which I’m proud.</p>
<p>All that said, had it not been for the Remarque Institute I would certainly have gone back to Europe. But being allowed to do everything I wanted and invite anyone I wanted to say anything they wanted, I experienced more freedom here as an academic than would have been possible in any other country or perhaps even university in the world. When I explained back in 2000 at a lunch in St John’s College Cambridge how Remarque worked, how much cash we had and how free I was to spend it as I chose, you could see them gagging…</p>
<p>And then of course there was the NYRB.</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: And yet, for all your dislike of the “personal being political,” it seems to me that this strong strand of English moralism requires a notion of the personal voice. Certainly, when it came to your controversial writings for the NYRB from 2003 on the Israeli Palestinian conflict, you partly stood up because you knew it would be harder to impugn you on personal grounds, given your background working as translator for the Israeli Defence Force during the Six Day War in 1967.</p>
<p><strong>TJ:</strong> But this is not about the personal being political. This is invoking the personal to create space in which to be political. But you are right that this is not something that came easy to me. I used to avoid the first person and personal memoirs like the plague. But it became clear that if I wanted to say unpopular things in large public places, I needed street cred. Being Jewish is not enough. Being an ex-Zionist is not enough. But being an ex-Zionist who wore the Israeli army uniform (and has a pic of himself complete with cutie and sub-machine gun): that helped. And in this case the end justified the means. No one can shut me up on this subject, so they are forced to resort to clichés about self-hating Jews and the like: evidence of failure.</p>
<p>All the same, it does irritate me when I am described as a controversialist and commentator on Israel. I see myself as first and above all a teacher of history; next a writer of European history; next a commentator on European affairs; next a public intellectual voice within the American Left; and only then an occasional, opportunistic participant in the pained American discussion of the Jewish matter…</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: I don’t want to go about this at length, because it does seem unfair that you’re identified with this one issue. However, the controversy surrounding the one state solution piece took a while to die down. Your op-eds seemed to disappear from <em>The New York Times</em>, and you no longer wrote for <em>The New Republic</em>. This was soon followed by the cancellation of a talk at the Polish Consulate in 2006. I recall there were Rabbis threatening to picket your lectures with holocaust survivors.</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: Again, all true. The rabbis of Riverdale (approximately the Golders Green of New York) got me banned from one talk and picketed another at a local high school, with picket-liners dressed as concentration camp inmates.</p>
<p>This ought to hurt a lot: some of my family disappeared into the camps and a large part of my childhood was side-shadowed by this memory. But all I can do is find it stupid. The influence of extremist Rabbis and the Anti-Defamation League worries me much more as a broader cultural phenomenon of (self-) censorship. As I have pointed out ad nauseam, I don’t lack platforms for my opinions so the problem is not the “silencing” of Judt. It is the closing of the Jewish mind here in America.</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: Around the same time, you also broke with prevailing US opinion on the issue of Iraq, taking both the Neocons to task, as well as their Liberal apologists. Like Obama, you seemed to recognise it was a dumb war of choice early on. However, if I recall rightly, you were—unlike much of the US or European Left—not opposed to liberal interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo.</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: In the 1990s, I was fully in favour of what is rather lazily called “liberal interventionism.” I prefer to think of it as taking seriously the UN Charter mandating protection of minorities extending into repressive states rather than stopping at their borders. But I recognize and always recognized the limitations. Politics, especially international politics, is about what is possible. You can intervene in Rwanda or Bosnia, you can’t in Chechnya (you in this case being the benevolent West). The reasons are obvious. But the charge of hypocrisy—why intervene only where you can and not where you should?—seems to me less weighty than the charge of opportunism: using the excuse that you can’t do everything in order to do nothing.</p>
<p>But just because I know that we could have intervened effectively and quickly in the Balkans or the Great Lakes, it doesn’t mean that I think there aren’t problems. However, I see a huge difference between sending in a couple of battalions of paratroops to smash Serbian irregulars on the hills outside Sarajevo, and inventing grounds for a pre-emptive war on an Arab state—whose murderous chieftain was until very recently our best friend in the region.</p>
<p>My objection to all my liberal friends who ran with the Iraq hawks is that they were not making the case for liberal interventionism but for exemplary war. On Afghanistan, I took the view in 2001 that a rapid response directed at a police-style operation to capture Osama was both politically prudent and legally justifiable. The longer it went on—the more it became a war and less a police operation—the less justifiable it was. And, of course, extending it into Iraq discredited the whole exercise.</p>
<p>On the general question: I don’t believe that one should have one-size-fits-all moral rules for international political action. That’s what misled Adam Michnik and Michael Ignatieff and others into saying that because they believed in truth and beauty and rights for Poles and Czechs, they had to believe in them for Iraqis as well and therefore could not oppose plans to liberate the latter. That isn’t how the world works. George Bush’s motives were not those of his intellectual apologists, with the result that the latter lose their autonomous ethical credibility and pollute their own pure purposes. Back in 1988, I wrote an essay about “The Dilemmas of Dissidence” in which I said that Havel and his friends were perfectly adapted to moral opposition under conditions of political impotence (late Communism); but that in later years, they would need to understand the very different terms in which political calculations get made in messy liberal worlds. They failed to do this, and their embarrassing subservience to Dick Cheney was the result.</p>
<p>Where does that leave me? Trying, as usual, to square general truths with particular circumstances. That’s the difference between pure ethics and political theory; but it isn’t resolved by simply abandoning the tension and sliding to one end of the pole.</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: Isn’t there a danger here that the contemporary historian gets pulled into cursory judgments and cloudy polemics. For example, while your diagnosis of the ideological dangers of Clinton’s triangulation or Blair’s New Labour have been vindicated over the years, you seem to already despair of the Obama administration in <em>Ill Fares the Land</em>. Isn’t it—much like the French Revolution according to Mao/Ho Chi Minh—a bit early to tell?</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: Excuse me, but it was Zhou Enlai who said that! Okay: anyone who opens his mouth in the present tense risks being proven wrong in retrospect. And of course I am free to be right or wrong about Obama depending upon how many years in the future you pick for your point of reference.</p>
<p>But: it was a distinctive quality of the Obama campaign that it offered not just particular legislation or programs, but a radical recasting of the mood of politics in a democracy dangerously detached from its own founding virtues. His complete failure to vindicate that promise—indeed, his abandoning of nearly all the terms of innovative political approach that got him elected—is far more serious and devastating than his particular failure to follow through on health policy, the Middle East, etc. He has raised and dashed hopes in a way that no one has done here for two generations. That seems to me grounds for despair. What would you have me say? That he may yet do better? That he inherited a tough situation? That all politics is the art of compromise? All true. And all secondary to the scale of lost hopes.</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: The “scale of lost hopes” could be an apt description of <em>Ill Fares the Land</em>, which must be your most political book to date: an impassioned attempt to revive the exhausted language of social democracy made all the more urgent, it seems to me, by two extraordinary circumstances. The most obvious is the credit crunch of 2008. But the second extraordinary thing is the personal circumstance under which you made this intervention. Because of the sudden onset and fast advance of Lou Gehrig’s disease, it must have taken an enormous act of will to imagine, mentally compose and then dictate this book.</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: I suppose so, though in retrospect things always seem tidier. Actually, what happened was that I was planning a sort of valedictory seminar talk at my own Institute last autumn, precisely on the lines of what became the lecture/book. The Dean of NYU talked me into doing it as a public lecture, which I undertook as a sort of personal and intellectual challenge: something between an effort of will and a determination to prove that what I had been saying about this disease—that it doesn’t affect your mind—was externally verifiable.</p>
<p>The next stage came when the New York Review offered to publish a polished version of the recorded lecture and various people, beginning with my agent, urged me to think of it as a book. Initially I declined, put off by the prospect of the work. Then I began to see a shape—and, of course, another challenge. The latter proved both huge and quite manageable: the bit that I thought would be hard—dictating a whole book from cold—became surprisingly familiar thanks to a fantastic assistant; the organization took shape thanks to nocturnal mental exercises as I have described. I suppose the book would have been a little tighter and maybe more methodologically consequential if I had done it the old way. But it would surely have lacked the energy and anger.</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: The other thing I notice about <em>Ill Fares the Land</em> is a sense of a generational “handing over.” The book often feels like a primer for those—like your sons—in their teens, who have little idea of the Keynesian post-war consensus (i.e. the state saves capitalism) that obtained both in Western Europe and the US in the thirty years after World War II. You then follow the neo-liberal dismantlement of those ideas of intervention, basically from the late 1970s onwards, and the social, political and even historical costs of this, especially in the former communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe.</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: Yes. I was conscious of this: having had to back-and-fill for my sons Daniel and Nicholas when explaining aspects of my lecture after the fact. And it really is the case that for the last decade on and off I have been talking these things through with students for whom all of that is, if not completely news, then certainly ancient history. And I do think that one of the original aspects of the book is my insistence on the “back to the future” aspect: that sometimes the best future entails recovering good pasts.</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: But there’s one question I have about this generational handing over. It was your generation, the baby boomers, the children of the 1960s, who felt the real benefit of social democratic security who also oversaw its dismantling. One could say the last thirty years have been accompanied by the grating sound of a whole generation pulling up the ladder behind them. I feel the anger, range of reference and intelligence in your response to this. But I’m not sure I detect an acknowledgement of any complicity.</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: Okay, okay. But I do say, again and again, that we 1960s people threw it away. Yes, the sound of a whole generation pulling up the ladder is not inaudible to me either, but I don’t feel complicit. I don’t recall ever being swept into the vortex of the “me” generation, nor did I ever believe that the personal is political, much less that we can afford to throw away the security blankets of the postwar years and just indulge.</p>
<p>God knows I can think of enough things that I did wrong both personally and as part of my cohort. But I never abandoned what I thought of as the benefits of the postwar consensus in favour of sectional advantage. Actually, I was always a bit awkward in this as other respects. As you know, I was against root-and-branch school comprehensivization on the grounds that the postwar arrangements combining meritocracy with opportunity, while imperfect and logically indefensible, were better than the radical schemes on offer – which have trashed much of the pedagogical gains of the early postwar decades.</p>
<p>In the same way, I never liked New Labour—something about the smug enthusiasm for success and wealth and public celebrity grated on my austerity-raised postwar personality. I recall a dinner party back in 1998 I believe, full of New Labourites and the more socially fashionable liberals. I hated it and felt old and Michael Footish. At the same time, the Labour party of Tony Benn always seemed provincial and deluded to me, for the obvious reasons. So I’m just an awkward customer, I guess.</p>
<p><strong>PJ:</strong> You said earlier that you tended to avoid the first person in your writing. But in the last few months that inhibition has gone and you’ve published some very personal pieces in the <em>NYRB</em>, about Revolution, Girls, Cars, Trains, even Putney. These aren’t memoirs in the traditional sense of preserving individual identity for future record. Indeed, they feel more like something else: where in the awful nocturnal immobility of the night you use your memory to make new connections, connections so dense, rich, often comic, sometimes tragic, that they go beyond narrative to something almost poetic.</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: Thanks! It really doesn’t always feel like that, but looking back I see a few good phrases…</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: I know you don’t write these in the traditional way, but compose them in your head using the classic <em>ars memoria</em> in the long empty hours of the night, and then dictate them in the morning. My sense is that these are not elegiac—setting yourself down for posterity—or angry ravings against the dying of the light, but a matter of more urgent personal survival: making sense of things, now, for you,</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: Yes. Certainly not Dylan Thomas. More a sense that I see better now than I could have done before the shape of all the little wholes of my life, even though I am seeing them now from the perspective of one very large incomplete. I don’t think I enjoyed living as much as I should have done—too busy thinking about it all the time. So now I am enjoying thinking about it (which is a different sort of thinking) and getting as close to enjoying it in the moment as retrieved memory will permit.</p>
<p>I do, though, note an occasional temptation to slip into analytical moralizing via past memory—another <em>déformation professionnelle</em>. I don’t altogether resist it, just try to keep it under control. It’s also, of course, my way of making sense of things. Not the only possible way—perhaps not even the only way that I might once have gone (in school I was better at literature than history and was urged by various interested parties to go in that direction, but something pulled me back).</p>
<p><strong>PJ</strong>: Now that you’ve finished the book, will the disease allow you to compose more?</p>
<p><strong>TJ</strong>: In one sense, yes. It’s getting a little harder to dictate, but only because of the irritating secondary symptoms: phlegm mostly. But if I wanted to write something, I certainly could. What will be an issue will be energy and concentration versus alternative claims upon them (e.g. boys); and also perhaps the difficulty of writing non-urgent texts, where huge bursts of mental energy are less forthcoming and sustained concentration is the problem. I truly don’t yet know the answer.</p>
</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>Interviews</category>
			<pubDate>Wed, 21 Jul 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Tony Judt: A Man of his Word</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/history-a-ideas/item/135-tony-judt-a-man-of-his-word</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/history-a-ideas/item/135-tony-judt-a-man-of-his-word</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="K2FeedImage"><img src="http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/media/k2/items/cache/be7685026070406a215779b242f1aa2e_S.jpg" alt="Tony Judt: A Man of his Word" /></div><div class="K2FeedIntroText"><p>&nbsp;Peter Jukes discusses history, life and justice with the late Tony Judt—a master of morally charged rhetoric</p>
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<p>Tony Judt and friend in Israel in 1967: being an ex-Zionist has helped him tackle the controversial issue of America’s relationship with Israel.</p>
<p>Tony Judt died, surrounded by his family, on the the evening of August 6th, 2010. The New York Times obituary can be <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/books/08judt.html?_r=1&amp;emc=eta1">read here</a>. A full transcript of Peter Jukes’s interview—the last in-depth interview Judt undertook before his depth—can be read on our website <a href="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/07/tony-judt-interview/">here</a>.</p>
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<p>Though not one to run shy of controversy, Tony Judt—historian, thinker, professor; commentator on the French left, American identity politics, Israel and much more besides—has never been one of those controversialists whose opposition can be predicted. In the many times I’ve heard him speak, I have never been able to guess in advance what he would say next.</p>
<p>Part of this unexpectedness is no doubt due to his career spent dealing with the exigencies of history rather than the sweeping formulations of philosophy or cultural theory. Born in London in 1948, Judt took a doctorate in history at Cambridge before moving to Paris to study at the Ecole Normale Superieure. His first book, Socialism in Provence 1871-1914, appeared in 1979 and explored a small slice of time in forensic depth. Next came a series of essays on the French left, followed by a book on postwar French intellectuals; it was only gradually that Judt moved on to larger canvasses. As he put it to me: “My first non-academic publication—a review in the Times Literary Supplement—did not come until the late 1980s. And it was not until 1993 that I published my first piece in the New York Review of Books. So that’s a 25-year learning curve.”</p>
<p>I interviewed Tony by email earlier this year (a full transcript of this exchange is available <a>here</a>). The motor neurone disease he was diagnosed with in 2008 has rendered him quadriplegic and he dictated his replies to an assistant. Tony and I have known each other for 12 years, having met at the 1998 Remarque Forum—a conference he sponsored as professor of history at New York University and the first of what would become almost an annual institution, devised to keep the transatlantic dialogue alive after the cold war. The event itself, located at a remote retreat on the border between Florida and Georgia, was no typical academic conference but comprised an eclectic mix of writers, entrepreneurs and other European and American professionals on top of the historians and political scientists—from a former ballet-dancing Swedish cultural attache to a neuroscientist who would go on to be the CNN doctor.</p>
<p>The subject matter was “cultural policy,” something Tony confessed he knew little about. But listening to him was like watching an experienced jazz musician find a new riff, as he discoursed in sentences of considerable syntactical complexity and nuance and arrived, unbidden, at new conclusions. Since few of us then knew who Tony Judt was, we argued back in equal measure. The forum remains my first and best experience of the power of public discourse: diverse, dissenting voices, encouraged to be provocative and exploratory.</p>
<p>Given the controversy that Tony’s writings have generated in recent years, it’s easy to forget just how instrumental the Forum, and the Remarque Institute he founded in 1995, have been in encouraging others to take intellectual courage. Tony admits he is something of an “awkward customer”—a trait that may derive from his childhood in a left-wing Jewish household in London, or his youth amid the adversarial dialectics of Oxbridge. The need to go marching towards the sound of cannon fire has taken him on various journeys—most notably to Israel in June 1967 during the six days war, when he worked as a translator and driver for the Israel Defence Force. He was in Paris in 1968, and visited Prague, Warsaw and California in the 1980s.</p>
<p>By the time I met Tony he was already writing the book on European history that would consolidate his international reputation: Postwar. Largely a work of assimilation and historical consensus, it was in the appendix—entitled “The Unconscious of History”—that Tony set about unpicking one of the times’ darker and more disturbing trends: the way memories of the Holocaust have been used and abused over the last 50 years. This background paved the way for him to enter one of the most contested issues in US intellectual life: America’s relationship with Israel and Zionism.</p>
<p>A 2003 essay in the New York Review of Books, “Israel: The Alternative,” triggered the first great furore. In it, Tony made the case for “a single, integrated, binational state of Jews and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians” rather than the “doomed” two-state solution. This argument has been heard in Israel since its foundation, but time and place are everything and Tony’s gift for saying “unpopular things in large public spaces” (his own words) brought widespread condemnation in the US.</p>
<p>Previously reticent about his background, Tony is honest about how he used his personal history to leverage this debate: “Being Jewish is not enough. Being an ex-Zionist is not enough. But being an ex-Zionist who wore the Israeli army uniform, and has a pic of himself complete with cutie and sub-machine gun [see opposite]: that helped. And in this case, the end justified the means. No one can shut me up on this subject, so they are forced to resort to cliches about self-hating Jews and the like: evidence of failure.” These revelations came at some personal cost. His op-eds disappeared for a while from the New York Times and he ceased writing for the New Republic. It’s still too early to tell whether Tony’s intervention helped or hindered productive dialogue, but he certainly opened a space to talk about middle-eastern politics which, in America at least, did not exist before.</p>
<p>And he did it with an acute sense of timing. The larger dramatic context was 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Being a member of the Remarque Forum email list in 2001-03 was a memorable lesson in how the transatlantic dialogue was drifting apart, especially when one of the New York contributors wrote, on the morning of 12th September: “We’re all Israelis now.” This was one of the moments when not quite knowing what Tony would say was nerve-wracking.</p>
<p>The Forum had often discussed Nato military action in Bosnia and Kosovo and—to the shock of some—Tony had fairly unequivocally supported it. One would thus have assumed he was in the camp of the “liberal interventionists,” especially when he also spoke out in favour of the initial policing actions in Afghanistan. But then along came Iraq, and in the September 2006 issue of the London Review of Books Tony produced a devastating critique of the co-option of liberals by the neocons—titled, after Lenin, “Bush’s Useful Idiots.”</p>
<p>Four years later, its conclusion still resonates: “Intellectuals should not be smugly theorising endless war, much less confidently promoting and excusing it. They should be engaged in disturbing the peace—their own above all.” As he explained it to me, “My objection to all my liberal friends who ran with the Iraq hawks is that they were not making the case for liberal interventionism but for exemplary war… I don’t believe that one should have one-size-fits-all moral rules for international political action. That’s what misled [Adam] Michnik and [Michael] Ignatieff and others: because they believed in rights for Czechs and Poles they had to believe in them for Iraqis too and so had to back plans to liberate the latter.”</p>
<p>For all this, Tony remains ambivalent about his role as a public figure. “It does irritate me when I am described as a controversialist and commentator on Israel. I see myself as first and above all a teacher of history; next a writer of European history; next a commentator on European affairs; next a public intellectual voice within the American left; and only then an occasional, opportunistic participant in the pained American discussion of the Jewish matter.”</p>
<p>There’s little doubt, though, that his restless drive to pursue an idea to its proper conclusion has lost Tony friends and allies over the years. It’s not just the authority of knowledge that makes him hard to ignore—there’s also the talent for the provocative comparison or phrase. Tony admits that even during his undergraduate days at King’s College, Cambridge, in the late 1960s, “I was—and knew I was—among the best speakers and writers of my age cohort… John Dunn, my favourite King’s supervisor, once described me as ‘the silver-tongued orator’: a barbed compliment, since it suggested that I spoke before I thought and seduced rather than convinced. But I like it all the same.”</p>
<p>One of the things that entranced me at that first meeting with Tony was this ability to “speak before thinking”—or, rather, to “think while speaking.” Even before the onset of motor neurone disease in 2008, which forced him to conflate speaking and writing (his subsequent works have all been composed in his head and then dictated), Tony both talked in joined-up literary sentences and wrote with an aphoristic freshness. You can see this stylistic mastery let loose in the pieces he has been publishing this year in the NYRB: 1,700-word slices of memory and reflection about, as he put it in the first of them, “events, people, or narratives that I can employ to divert my mind from the body in which it is encased.”</p>
<p>Apart from these, the major work written under the extraordinary conditions of his paralysing illness is also Tony’s least historical and most overtly political. Published this March, Ill Fares the Land began life as a public lecture undertaken “to prove that what I had been saying about this disease—that it doesn’t affect your mind—was externally verifiable… I suppose the book would have been a little tighter and maybe more methodologically consequential if I had done it the old way. But it would surely have lacked the energy and anger.”</p>
<p>The result is an indictment of the Anglo-Saxon model of free-market economics since 1979. If there’s an element of improvisation to the book’s origin, there’s nothing ad hoc about the host of references it unlocks. The historical range underpinning Postwar is all here, but deployed to explain that government wasn’t always bad and that collective action wasn’t always tainted by the “socialist” authoritarian smear.</p>
<p>Dedicated to Tony’s two American-born sons, the text tries to address both a transatlantic and generational divide. The result is an occasionally awkward attempt to reach very different audiences, but from its opening sentence it rarely ceases to compel: “Something is profoundly wrong with the way we live today. For 30 years we have made a virtue out of the pursuit of material self-interest: indeed, this very pursuit now constitutes whatever remains of our sense of collective purpose.” Ill Fares the Land has attracted some negative reviews from both right and left for skipping over the historical failures of Keynesianism and the electoral success of the “third way.” But the financial collapse of 2008 and the way the state had to step in and “save capitalism” are pretty unassailable arguments against the status quo ante.</p>
<p>What Ill Fares the Land does not do is describe a grand project for a brand new hegemonic future—it’s much more modest than that. When I ask him about what some might see as the book’s inherently tragic vision, Tony rejects the idea: “You can’t have a tragic vision in politics: not if you wish to intervene and convince… One of the very few things that I know I believe strongly is that we must learn how to make a better world out of usable pasts rather than dreaming of infinite futures. It’s a very late-Enlightenment view that says that the only way to make a better future is to believe that the future will be better.”</p>
<p>Judt has studied, combated and even taken part in many of the radical new beginnings of the last 60 years: Zionism, the new left, deconstructionism, neoconservatism, neo-liberalism, new Labour. Yet from a deep-rooted left-wing liberal perspective, Ill Fares the Land ultimately offers a conservative conclusion. The left has lost too much in its obsession with newness and creative destruction, it argues. The “usable pasts,” with all their limitations and possibilities, have the virtue of being known.</p>
<p>One of these pasts is the lost role of the public intellectual: well-informed but willing to range beyond the ghetto of expertise—who doesn’t just observe but also tries to intervene or provoke. The economic background to Ill Fares the Land might be incomplete but the reappraising anger is just. Tony’s willingness to take on this topic—to use his fast-depleting energies on this particular stage at this particular time—is yet another dramatic intervention, combining a personal voice with a knowledge of history and sense of occasion in a way that is both responsive and responsible, timely and moral.<br /> <strong><br /> <a href="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/07/tony-judt-interview/">Click here</a> to read the full transcript of Peter Jukes’ interview with Tony Judt</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>History &amp; Ideas</category>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Jul 2010 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
			<enclosure url="http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/media/k2/items/cache/be7685026070406a215779b242f1aa2e_S.jpg" length="19739" type="image/jpeg"/>
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			<title>He Went There: Obama Attacks the 1 percent</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/blogs/item/124-he-went-there-obama-attacks-the-1-percent</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/blogs/item/124-he-went-there-obama-attacks-the-1-percent</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="K2FeedIntroText"><p><img src="http://i39.photobucket.com/albums/e199/peterjukes/motley%20moose/presidentialprank.jpg" width="300" style="float: left; margin: 7px;" />Thank God. Finally. Having come to office with a promise of healing divisions, and being faced with an obstructionist opposition veering increasingly to the zero tax anarchy of the Libertarian Right, your President finally came clean. No he isn't a corporate tool. (Hell, if he was, wouldn't he have taken those Wall St job offers rather than a meagre community organisers job?). Yes,<a href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/04/13/966609/-President-Obamas-fiscal-policy-speech"> he went there</a>, and picked on that 1% which <a href="http://www.vanityfair.com/society/features/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105">Joseph Steiglitz</a> has so graphically depicted as enriching themselves in the last two decades. For those who haven't read it: here's his opening premise:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"It’s no use pretending that what has obviously happened has not in fact happened. <strong>The upper 1 percent of Americans are now taking in nearly a quarter of the nation’s income every year. In terms of wealth rather than income, the top 1 percent control 40 percent.</strong> Their lot in life has improved considerably. Twenty-five years ago, the corresponding figures were 12 percent and 33 percent. One response might be to celebrate the ingenuity and drive that brought good fortune to these people, and to contend that a rising tide lifts all boats. That response would be misguided. <strong>While the top 1 percent have seen their incomes rise 18 percent over the past decade, those in the middle have actually seen their incomes fall. </strong>For men with only high-school degrees, the decline has been precipitous—12 percent in the last quarter-century alone. All the growth in recent decades—and more—has gone to those at the top. In terms of income equality, America lags behind any country in the old, ossified Europe that President George W. Bush used to deride. Among our closest counterparts are Russia with its oligarchs and Iran. While many of the old centers of inequality in Latin America, such as Brazil, have been striving in recent years, rather successfully, to improve the plight of the poor and reduce gaps in income, America has allowed inequality to grow."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>My emphases</p>
<p>&nbsp;Does Obama listen? Does he dismiss as sanctimonious those who have criticised him for not pushing back? For being missing? Not any more. Here's the moneyquote from his speech today.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"Think about it. In the last decade, the average income of the bottom 90% of all working Americans actually declined. <strong>The top 1% saw their income rise by an average of more than a quarter of a million dollars each. And that’s who needs to pay less taxes? </strong> They want to give people like me a two hundred thousand dollar tax cut that’s paid for by asking thirty three seniors to each pay six thousand dollars more in health costs? <strong>That’s not right, and it’s not going to happen as long as I’m President.</strong> The fact is, their vision is less about reducing the deficit than it is about changing the basic social compact in America."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>(Full speech <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/04/13/966610/-The-Full-Speech-Before-its-Given">here</a>) Full disclosure. Though I'm thought of as an Obamabot, I'm actually well to the left on economic issues, especially income inequality, financial modal monopolies, and the importance of a mixed economy. Having sought consensus, and being delivered with a financial crisis not covered by his electoral mandate, I'm glad there are signs he is finally pushing back on this issue. His argument is fact based, personal, anecdotal. It's not about ideology but reality. It's one of the few ways to convince what, in the 30 years I have known it, has become an increasingly right wing anti Government country. What do my fellow Kossacks think?</p>
<p>See comments and replies to original diary on Dkos</p>
<p><a href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/04/13/966615/-He-Went-There!-Obama-Attacks-the-1">http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/04/13/966615/-He-Went-There!-Obama-Attacks-the-1</a></p></div>]]></description>
			<category>Blogs</category>
			<pubDate>Mon, 11 Apr 2011 00:35:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Shock and Awe: Apocalyptic Thinking</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/history-a-ideas/item/122-shock-and-awe-apocalyptic-thinking</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/history-a-ideas/item/122-shock-and-awe-apocalyptic-thinking</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="K2FeedIntroText"><h1><strong style="color: #444444; line-height: 1.71428571; font-size: 12px;"><img src="http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/images/12dream1.jpg" alt="12dream1" /></strong></h1>
<h2><strong>THE DARK WAVE</strong></h2>
<p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>
<p style="margin: 0cm 1.3pt 0.0001pt 36pt;"><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"><em>&nbsp;“Looking out to sea, I noticed a dark black object travelling toward the shore. At first sight it seemed like a low range of hills rising out of the water…. A second glance – and a very hurried one at that – convinced me that it was a lofty ridge of water many feet high.”</em></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"><strong>&nbsp;</strong></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">That’s how a Dutchman saw the advance of a massive wave on the small Indonesian town of </span>Anjer<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">. He was also one of the few to survive and describe its retreat.</span></p>
<p style="margin-left: 36pt;"><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"><em>“The sight of those receding waters haunts me still… As I clung to the palm tree…. There floated past the dead bodies of many friend and neighbour. Only a mere handful of the population escaped... scarcely a trace remains of where the once busy, thriving town originally stood.”<strong>[1]</strong></em></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">This description, horribly familiar after the </span>Indian Ocean<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> earthquake of late 2004, is in fact an eye witness account of the massive eruption of Krakatoa in August 1883. Though separated by over a century these two cataclysms are closely connected. Both took place along the same plate boundary in one the most tectonically active parts of the world. On both occasions it was the subsequent sea surges rather than the original eruption or earthquake that caused the most devastation and loss of life. From a geological perspective, neither events are exceptional, just the regular release of energy from a subduction zone where the Indo-Australian and Eurasian continental plates collide. But Krakatoa marks a significant moment in human history. As Simon Winchester explains in his timely book, the development of the electronic telegraph, deep sea cabling, and the burgeoning news organisation founded by Julius Reuter, meant that news of the 1883 eruption travelled round the world within 24 hours. Krakatoa was probably the first time a natural disaster became a global news event.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">Over a hundred years later, thanks to advances in scientific knowledge, we understand the mechanisms of plate tectonics and can – to a limited extent – predict and mitigate their impact. But though science provides a rational explanation of natural disasters, modern mass communication can have the opposite effect. We now witness the calamity almost instantaneously. Images of terror and death come crashing through our TVs into our living rooms. With the wide availability of hand-held video cameras we also experience the scenes from a vivid personal perspective; parents screaming at their kids to back away the hotel balcony as a second wave comes; holiday-makers trying to outrun the tsunami through forests and paddy fields; and most haunting of all, a wedding video from Banda Aceh which ended with shots of a town swept away in a turbid mass of bodies, vehicles and debris.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">Modernity may have eliminated much of the mystery of many disasters, but it has done nothing to diminish their terror. In fact media images seem to affect our perception of the events themselves with many eye witnesses describing the experience as being ‘like a dream’ or ‘something out of movie’. A feeling of unreality is common to many survivors of such traumas, particularly children, who talk of the disaster as if it had been foretold in stories in or prefigured in dreams.[2] &nbsp;Indeed these nightmarish visions may need no real event to provoke them.</span></p>
<p style="margin-left: 36pt;"><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"><em>"I saw this image in my sleep, how many great waters poured from heaven, drowning the whole land… &nbsp;The deluge fell with such frightening swiftness, wind, and roaring that when I awoke, my whole body trembled; for a long while I could not come to myself. So when I arose in the morning, I painted what I had seen."&nbsp; <strong>[3]</strong></em></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">This description was scrawled in 1525 by Albrecht Dürer beneath his sketch ‘The Deluge: a Vision’. Years earlier, as a young man, Dürer had made his fame and fortune as a purveyor of apocalyptic imagery. The years leading up to 1500 were filled with political and religious fervour, and Dürer’s woodcuts of the Book of Revelations are one of the first best sellers of the age of mechanical reproduction. But this impromptu watercolour is a private nightmare, more personal and disturbing. Stripped of religious imagery and symbolism, it shows large dark blob of water looming over the landscape looking prophetically like the base of a mushroom cloud.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">It seems, with or without direct experience, we have a deep psychological need to <em>imagine the worst</em> before it happens. These cataclysmic visions haunt our dreams and pervade our culture. But where does this fascination with catastrophe come from? To a certain extent it’s obvious: our evolutionary success as species is linked with the sudden leap in brain power which allowed us to extrapolate, imagine the future, and plan ahead. Humans are highly successful ‘scenario building machines’</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[4], and projecting calamities, floods, earthquakes, may be a mental early-warning system to help us prepare for the worst, act accordingly, and survive. But another dream suggests that our fascination with destruction may not always help us avoid it.</span></p>
<p style="margin-left: 36pt;"><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"><em>“I dreamed I saw a great wave climbing over green lands and above the hills. I stood upon the brink. It was utterly dark and hideous before my feet…. I could only stand there, waiting…”<strong>[5]</strong></em></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">This was the childhood nightmare of another master of apocalyptic narrative, J.R.R. Tolkien, and shows how the dream of destruction can lead to paralysis rather than action. We are frozen, rooted to the spot, surrendering to the awe-inspiring force of nature. This feeling of acquiescence explains the almost mystical feelings people have about catastrophes: they are our contact with a power greater than ourselves – through their terror we touch the face of God.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">About two weeks after </span>Indian Ocean<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> disaster, driving through the well heeled suburbs of </span>Atlanta<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> I saw an electronic billboard advertising a service for a neighbourhood church: TSUNAMI: ARE THESE THE END TIMES?&nbsp; Here, amid the paraphernalia of modernity, the drive-by banks, Starbucks cafes, wireless networks and SUV’s, was a reversion to an older mythical way of thought. Whatever the advances of science and technology, however widely dispersed is the knowledge of continental drift and geophysics, it seems many of us are still addicted to signs and portents, to seeing in random or natural events some hidden plan or divine narrative.&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">This is what I call a<em>pocalyptic thinking. </em>Sometimes this archaic but powerful narrative is as obvious as a billboard in </span>Georgia<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">. But the myth also persists I believe at an unconscious level in secular ideologies, popular culture, and contemporary politics.&nbsp; Not surprisingly, we can find the most complete account of it in religion.</span></p>
<h2><strong>RELIGION AND TERROR: DIVINE VIOLENCE</strong></h2>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">If religion is anything it is <em>totalising </em>influence, and makes claims over all of our lives, from our personal morals and social customs to explanations of how the cosmos originated and humanity began. It is in the area of <em>origins</em> that religion still regularly clashes with secularism and science – whether in the debates about the moment of conception, abortion and stem cell research, or in the continuing objection to teaching Darwinian evolution in </span>Kansas<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> schools.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">One common complaint about the scientific narrative of origins is that it is cold, soulless, and reduces humanity to a series of haphazard evolutionary accidents. However, a quick look at religious accounts of origins is hardly more comforting. In most great myths, the floods in Gilgamesh, Inca and Mayan tales, or the great battles of the Mahabharata, divine creation is accompanied by conflict and cosmic turmoil. In the early Hebrew texts Yahweh also shows the same capricious divine violence, culminating in the destructiveness of the biblical flood. But once Abraham has offered his son Isaac for sacrifice, God starts controlling his temper. He intervenes more indirectly and subtly, through the rise and fall of genealogies, kingdoms and nations. As fitting for a self contained and exiled people, God becomes more remote and self contained. His main promise is in the <em>future</em>.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'times new roman', times;">It is probably no coincidence that the three great religions that flow from this Abrahamic tradition have themselves had such an impact on world history. Judaism, Christianity and Islam all have strong messianic elements, preaching of a God that remains aloof but interested in human affairs but will one day reinstitute His kingdom and holy law. In a sense, the great innovation of these three monotheisms is that they off an explanation of future <em>ends</em> as much as historic origins [6]. But these ends are more often than not apocalyptic – as tumultuous as the collision of tectonic plates.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'times new roman', times;">Descriptions of the Last Times vary in detail, but their significant elements remain the same.&nbsp; The usual social order is inverted. Guests are not safe. Father is set against son. Children are disobedient to their parents and show no gratitude. A wider social breakdown occurs. All respect for authority is lost. The pious seem insane while madman govern. Vice is called virtue, and vice versa. The world falls into promiscuity and enters a dreadful decadent epoch.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">In the countryside, the land is divided, and excessive wealth is dug from mines. Gold and iron is used a means of greed and war. Natural resources are exploited. Young and pregnant animals are killed for their skins. Forests are burnt and lakes are drained. Soon the natural order is disrupted: there is darkness at </span>noon<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">, unseasonal weather - snow in summer and drought in winter. Fruit rots on the trees, grapes on the vines. The earth turns barren. The air thickens. In the cities, luxury reigns, then gluttony then lascivious insolence. Men behave like goats and sheep, fowls and swine. &nbsp;The day of destruction nears.&nbsp; Apostates, false prophets and messiahs appear. The majority turn to idolatry, while the faithful few wait for a sign. A last battle looms, a final struggle or jihad. The tiny band of the faithful looks like it will be easily overwhelmed by the unbelievers. But then there is sign - a great wind, or a fire, or a plague, or a flood - as God finally intervenes. Mountains are separated like carded wool. Mankind is scattered like moths. The destruction is a purgation,<em> negating the negation, </em>the sweeping away the vanity of the old world for a new to appear.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">One can see how this messianic tradition thrived (and continues to thrive) as an underground movement through varied contexts of oppression or exile. The prophet is a social satirist, revolutionary, and </span>Hollywood<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> movie maker rolled into one. By projecting compelling visions of Doomsday with all the twists and reversals of the genre, he is a dreamer of the absolute, providing a critique of the existing social order. For underneath the apparent fatalism and nihilism is a utopian impulse – a desire for good government and social justice. Judgement day in the prophetic tradition is not just God’s judgement on mankind, but our judgement on ourselves.</span><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[7] &nbsp;A small amendment to the words of 19<sup>th</sup> century father of anarchism, Mikhail Bakunin, shows how the central premise remained relevant in the Age of Revolutions.</span></p>
<p style="margin-left: 36pt;"><em><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">&nbsp;'Revolution [Revelation] &nbsp;requires extensive and widespread destruction, a fecund and renovating destruction, since in this way and only in this way are new worlds born...'</span> <strong><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[8]</span></strong></em></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">Since the Book of Revelation is an apocryphal addition to the Christian Bible, it is sometimes argued that apocalyptic thought is only a marginal strand of Christianity, but this ignores the messianic elements scattered throughout New and Old Testaments (especially Ezekiel and Zachariah). In the early years of the Christian church an entire branch of theology, eschatology - the study of last things - was devoted to the apocalypse and many of the great theological schisms centred round the supposed date of the day of judgement. Throughout the middle ages, well into the Reformation, millennial sects emerged to exploit or interpret times of crisis and social upheaval as signs of the second coming.[9] </span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">This radical tradition also took root in North America with the non-conformists who founded the early colonies. Apocalyptic prophesy flourished during Second Great Awakening in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and has remained a central tenet of many of the evangelical churches in US, particularly among The Church of the Latter Day Saints (Mormons), Seventh Day Adventists and Jehovah’s witnesses. These churches – which are some of the most rapidly expanding today – have in turn inspired a cultural movement obsessed with apocalyptic interpretation of current events. One of the most popular of these is the ‘Left Behind’ novels by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins which have sold over 40 million copies worldwide.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'times new roman', times;">This brings us to a perverse aspect of religious belief. For many agnostics and atheists, the death toll of natural catastrophes is used an argument <em>against</em> divine intervention or design. The same questions were raised in the newspapers after the recent Tsunami as Voltaire asked after the </span>Lisbon<span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'times new roman', times;"> earthquake of 1755: how can any benign God let such things happen? But this presupposes that God’s will is scrutable, and moreover misses one important part of his appeal: he is <em>Dies Irae </em>as well as God of Love: his power and glory is displayed in wrath and terror as well as hope. A poll soon after the Tsunami confirms this paradox. Nearly twenty per cent of respondents in </span>Ireland<span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'times new roman', times;"> thought the disaster actually deepened their religious belief.[10] &nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'times new roman', times;">I would go further and argue there is something in the Abrahamic monotheistic tradition which is inherently apocalyptic, and therefore lends itself easily to violence and terror. Martyrs are willing to sacrifice this life for the life hereafter, and as we have seen long before the advent of suicide bombers, they are often willing to take other people with them. It may be a big leap to from individual martyrdom to the extinction of earth, but in apocalyptic thinking the leap is easily made. On a purely practical level, the belief in other worlds makes us much more wanton with the one we’ve got. If the mundane material world is just a shadow play of an ideal everlasting reality, is it not more easily disposable?&nbsp; Apocalypse means 'tearing the veil' and maybe that veil has to be ripped to shreds to reveal the true order beneath. In a sense, it’s better to believe that some kind of agency is in control – even if this is manifest in the destruction of the world – than to imagine the universe is random.</span></p>
<h2><strong>UNFORGETTABLE FIRES: THE AESTHETICS OF DISASTER</strong></h2>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">Max Weber suggested that one of the great achievements of the Enlightenment was that it separated the totalising claims of religion into three distinct secular spheres; knowledge about the universe became the domain of science: codes of personal or political behaviour went to ethics and law: while the emotional solace and sensuous appeal of religion became the province of the arts.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">We don’t have to look far to see where the apocalyptic element survives in modern aesthetics, From <em>Birth of a Nation,</em> through the fires of Atlanta in <em>Gone with the Wind </em>to the closing napalm sequence of <em>Apocalypse Now</em>, the spectacle of destruction has been a key component of the Hollywood film since its inception. Disaster Movies like <em>Armageddon, Independence Day, The Day After </em>are typical summer blockbuster fare, and even in other genres, such the <em>Terminator </em>or the James Bond franchise, inevitably end in a big bang as the nuclear warhead is detonated or the evil mastermind’s lair is blown up. It is easy to dismiss these pyrotechnics as adolescent fantasies, but as Gaston Bachelard points out in the ‘The Psychoanalysis of Fire’, such images enthral us for a good reason: “fire suggests the desire to change, to speed up the passage of time, to bring all life to its conclusion, to its hereafter... The fascinated individual hears the call of the funeral pyre. For him destruction is more than a change, it is a renewal.” [11]</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">It is an important insight. Disasters are not the total negation of things, but a rapid process of change from one state to another. Huge explosions are startling demonstration of matter being turned into energy. To watch buildings demolished, or even people blown up, is a perverse revelation of their inner structure. This aesthetic attraction to potent and unpredictable forces has a long a venerable tradition. In classical theory is known as the <em>sublime.<strong>[12]</strong></em></span></p>
<p style="margin-left: 36pt;"><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"><em>Bold, overhanging, and as it were threatening, rocks; clouds piled up in the sky, moving with lightning flashes and thunder peals, volcanoes in all their violence of destruction; hurricanes with their track of devastation; the boundless sea in a state of tumult… The sight of them is more attractive, the more fearful it is, provided only that we are in security; and we readily call these objects <span style="text-decoration: underline;">sublime because they raise the energies of the soul above their accustomed height… to measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness of nature<strong>[13]</strong> </span></em></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">Kant’s description of the sublime could easily be applied to most apocalyptic imagery. So too could his caveat ‘The sight of them is more attractive… provided that we are in security’. The real appeal of disaster movies is that, no matter how close the camera gets, we as an audience are actually at a safe distance.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'times new roman', times;">A sense of distance from the spectacle is also something that separates the sublime from one of the other great genre inherited from classical antiquity – Tragedy. For though we speak of disasters as being ‘tragic’, tragedy doesn’t need explosions, or final battles, or lightning. It happens on a smaller more personal scale and surprise is secondary for the outcome of a tragic story is rarely in doubt. The audience know in advance that Oedipus, in his high minded quest to rid </span>Thebes<span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'times new roman', times;"> of its curse, will actually discover he has inadvertently murdered his father and incestuously married his mother. The same is true of Hamlet’s hesitation in avenging his father’s death, or Uncle Vanya’s inability to declare his true feelings, or Willy Loman’s failure to hit his sales targets. We know what is going to happen, and our objective awareness of the inevitability of the story gives us, in Aristotelian terms, the feeling of <em>terror. </em>But our identification with the central hero, our subjective engagement and sympathy with his with flawed intentions, compensates for this distance with a feeling of <em>pity</em>.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">Contrast this tragic catharsis with the sublime apocalyptic vision. Events happen in sudden unexpected shifts, usually in a massive landscape of clashing armies and thundering elements. Where individuals are depicted and some kind of empathy results, this is usually abruptly curtailed by the brutal intrusion of powerful impersonal forces. Instead of the Aristotelian catharsis of pity and terror, our main emotional response to the sublime is <em>shock </em>and <em>awe:</em> shock at the violence; awe at the forces revealed. This violence doesn’t have to be on a particularly epic in scale either. In Sophocles’ <em>Oedipus Rex</em>, for example, the hero’s self immolation takes place behind a screen. We have only Oedipus’ verbal account of his blinding and, in a sense, we <em>see</em> his blindness from the inside. At the polar opposite of this experience is the blinding in Bunuel’s <em>Un Chien Andalou. </em>We see a eye forced open – then a razor slash - then vitreous fluid pouring out of the eyeball. The sight is so graphic it is almost impossible to watch. We have objective clarity of vision, in close-up, but a subjectively we are totally blind to the human cost.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">It may be an abrupt shift from Greek Tragedy to 20<sup>th</sup> century surrealism, but it serves the purpose of emphasising how the apocalyptic sublime has survived in much modern art. From the salon de refusės, through cubism, Dadaism, fauvism, futurism, constructivism to modern conceptual art, there has been an avowed manifesto of iconoclasm, a consistent desire to shock the audience. If tearing the veil is an apocalyptic impulse, then this an apocalyptic aesthetics is at the heart of the <em>avant garde</em> project, both in its content and treatment of forms. Antonin Artaud expressed it in his Theatre of Cruelty ,and similar violent ruptures preoccupy film, literature, music, sculpture and poetry. But the problem with shock tactics is that they are subject to a harsh law of diminishing returns: to keep ‘challenging’ audiences artists require increasingly virtuoso performances, culminating in cows sliced up and put in formaldehyde.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">In such extreme artistic images the Weberian separation between science, ethics and arts begins to break down. Should our judgements be moral, aesthetic or forensic? &nbsp;&nbsp;If this confusion could just remain in the art gallery it might be classed as ‘interesting’, but the uncertainty also affects how real events are mediated. One classic case is from the Gulf War in 1991. When the CNN team reported from Al Rashid hotel on the first night of bombing of </span>Baghdad<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">, they described it ‘the most fantastic fireworks demonstration since the fourth of July’, the flak from the anti-aircraft guns as ‘like a million fireflies’. One of the reporters had to be checked when he kept on describing the beauty. The aesthetic excitement at the spectacle was undermined by the moral revulsion at the fact that people were being killed – and all this in what was supposed to be a factual objective news report. Now wonder the conflict over </span>Kuwait<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> became known as the first ‘virtual war’, but worse was yet to come.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">What finally shattered the accepted norms of media coverage was the Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001. Images from 9/11 are still difficult to deal with, too horrific and disturbing to be merely iconic they also have their terrible sublime beauty. The images from ground zero are probably the most widely distributed mass media images of the age, and some of the most unrepeatable and taboo. There’s also no doubt that the perpetrators of the attacks chose their targets for their symbolic publicity value as part of an avowed campaign of ‘cultural destabilisation’. The essence of a terror campaign is psychological disturbance as much as physical devastation. In religious terrorism this psychic warfare is all the more important because one is ultimately fighting for souls rather than territory. Osama Bin Laden’s achievement was not just to turn civilian planes into guided missiles, but also to transform the technology of 24 hour media coverage into a global propaganda coup. It was another escalation in the virtual war.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">Not long after the terrorist attacks on </span>New York<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> and </span>Washington<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">, and over a decade after CNN was so roundly criticised for their coverage of the Baghdad Bombing, the </span>National Defense University<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> designed a battle plan for the Pentagon. By combining a vast simultaneous attack by stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and high altitude bombers, the aim was less to destroy military forces than to inflict a massive psychological blow to the enemy's will. The plan was called "Shock and Awe" and, to great media fanfare, was launched on </span>Baghdad<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> on the night of </span>March 21<sup><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">st</span></sup> 2003<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">.</span></p>
<p><strong>&nbsp;</strong></p>
<h2><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"><strong>THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES: A NEW DIVIDE?</strong></span></h2>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">In a mediated world, where moral, political and even scientific judgements can’t be separated from the imagery through which we perceive them, it’s not just Weber’s distinctions that are eroded: the whole Enlightenment edifice is under attack. Back in 1990, after the Berlin Wall fell, intellectuals from right and left were already announcing the End of History - at least history in its linear enlightenment version of progress and social advancement.[14] In a reaction against modern 'soullessness', people would turn elsewhere, seek a reunion with the dead and follow their desire for the 'beyond'. [15] In other words, religion would have its second coming.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">To a certain extent these prophesies have come to pass. Religion is regarded as an increasingly powerful political and historical force in first decade of the new millennium. In her book <em>The Battle for God</em> Karen Armstrong describes the rise of Christian, Islamic and Jewish fundamentalism as “embattled forms of spirituality, which have emerged as a response to perceived crisis… Fundamentalists do not perceive this battle as a conventional political struggle, but experience this as a <em>cosmic war between the forces of good and evil</em>.” &nbsp;‘Fundamentalist’ is a problematic adjective in that it implies a backward-looking, conservative force and misses the radical, revolutionary agenda. Perhaps a better term for these militant religious movements is ‘apocalyptic’.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">In </span>Europe<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">, with our spreading secularism and lack of church attendance, we tend to see this fundamentalist apocalyptic trend as deeply alien. It belongs to Wahabi Madrassahs on the </span>Pakistan<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> border, Ultra-Orthodox Jewish settlements on the </span>West Bank<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> or - perhaps more worrying – to born again Christians on </span>Texas<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">’ ranches. </span><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[16] One of the recurrent themes of the coverage of the 2004 US presidential elections was George W Bush’s religious faith: his reported belief that he was divinely ordained to lead the country through the war on terror, and that when consulting on political decisions he answered to a ‘higher father’.<span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[17] The success of his strategist, Karl Rove, in mobilising the evangelical vote is often cited as the key component to of election success. Liberal commentators on both sides of the Atlantic now fear that Bush is beholden to the Christian fundamentalists on the radical right, evangelical prophets like Tim LaHaye, co-author of the ‘Left Behind’ novels, who described 9/11 as a wake up call to America: “Suddenly, our false sense of security was shaken. Now we realize we’re vulnerable. And that fear can lead many people to Christ… I see many signs of the Lord’s return.”<span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[18]</span></span></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">The only problem with this fear is that recent history does not support it. After all, it was only twenty years ago that a conservative republican president was in power with the key support of the religious right. As Gore Vidal reflected ominously at the time, this president was also infected by biblical rhetoric, talking of ‘evil empires’ and apocalyptic struggles. During a time of nuclear re-armament and conflict in the Middle East, he listened to theologians like Hal Lyndsey who believed that Soviet Union was the ‘Gog’ of Old Testament prophesy and reminded him that Armageddon is actually a village 55 miles to the north-east of Tel Aviv.[19] </span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'times new roman', times;">But for all the millenarian prognostications of the faithful, and the liberal forebodings of the sceptical, President Reagan’s administration led to the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall and a reduction in nuclear stockpiles.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">Our mistake is to take the evangelical rhetoric of the American religious right at face value and, from our own history of religious wars, believe the ideology is more established and totalitarian that is actually the case. At first sight it’s paradox that the first major nation to institute a separation of church and state should boast so much religiosity in its politics, and such a thriving ‘faith based’ sector. But without the backing of the state, preachers have always had to sell themselves in the American marketplace. (Hence the attention-grabbing sign ‘Are these the End Times?’ in </span>Atlanta<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">.) We should also remember that nearly half the nation, the powerful coastal and mid-west states and city populations that voted for Kerry, share a similar sceptical belief-system about war and conflict as Europeans.[20] Meanwhile, Christianity in the remaining red states is less like an organised religion and more like a competitive market, with churches and creeds rising and falling, going big and then going bust, like any other commercial US sector. American faith, even in highly successful organisations like the Church of the Latter Day Saints, is highly unorthodox and individualistic, and the alliance of believers to their creeds probably more akin to a consumers commitment to a brand. For all the talk of end of the world and the approach of doomsday, most Americans are still optimistic and much less fatalistic than, say, Germans about their lives being controlled by outside forces.[21]</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">A sense of history should stop us from being too pessimistic about American apocalyptic thinking. It should also prevent us from being too optimistic about European immunity to it. I hope this brief tour will have indicated how it still permeates many aspects of secular culture and ideology. The messianic fervour elicited by Bakunin runs through many supposedly secular ideologies of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Both Communism and Fascism created their ‘elects’ – a vanguard of true believers – and projected the future as a series of catastrophes, whether of class struggle or some neo Darwinian racial competition. Even the religious imagery is recognisable: the SS ‘totenkopf’ skull insignia is borrowed from medieval millennial art; the heroes of Marxist Leninism in Soviet iconography look like bearded patriarchs clutching their sacred books; But the most important difference between the American and European apocalypse is much starker and more simple. Within living memory </span>Europe<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> has an active battleground for the clash of absolutes, cities were razed, populations destroyed, for competing visions of a new world order.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;">Those living memories are fading fast, and it’s always easier to divide up the world into sheep and goats than to hold on to a complicated nuanced vision. Though most Europeans won’t go the whole way and describe the </span>US<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> as the ‘Great Satan’, it’s not unusual to hear people now cite the </span>US<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> as the main cause for most of the ills of the time, from ecological collapse, globalisation, unemployment, cultural decay, and the forced consumption of Starbucks cappuccinos. I have personally heard well respected intellectuals and commentators, both in the UK and Germany, suggest that the US brought the 9/11 attacks upon themselves, not because of any foreign policy blunder, but because Hollywood had already projected such disasters in movies, and the culture had at times imagined its own demise. In such a way are signs taken for wonders, causes confused with effects. Those who polarise the debate between a secular tolerant </span>Europe<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> and a hell-bent born again </span>America<span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"> are as guilty of the apocalyptic way of thinking they claim to despise.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: right;" align="right"><span style="font-family: 'times new roman', times; font-size: 12pt;"><em>Peter Jukes March 2005</em></span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[1] Quoted inSimon Winchester, <em>Krakatoa</em>,&nbsp; London 2003</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[2] One of the acute forms of&nbsp; Post Traumatic Stress Disorder is known as ‘Omen Formation’, in which the victim sees signs and portents of the trauma everywhere.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[3] <em>The Deluge</em> can be seen in Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna. The nuclear resonances of the picture are explored by John Berger in ‘Two Dreams’, <em>The White Bird,</em>&nbsp; New York, 1985.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[4] See Malcolm Gladwell, <em>Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, </em>New York, 2005, but more importantly Stephen Pinker, <em>The Language Instinct</em>, New York,1994</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[5] These lines taken from the DVD of&nbsp; <em>The Return of the King</em>. New Line Productions, 2004. In the third volume The Lord of the Rings book they are attributed to Faramir. Various biographies claim this was a childhood dream of Tolkien’s.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[6].In other religions this trend is not so clear. There are apocalyptic elements in some traditions of Hindu fundamentalism, especially around Shiva and his incarnations. Sri Lankan Buddhism is reported to have developed militant strands thanks to the recent civil war, and the Aum Shinrikyo sect, which launched the sarin attack on the Tokyo metro system in 1995, combined Buddhist elements with a quasi scientific belief in an imminent catastrophe.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[7]&nbsp; In English the original meaning of ‘doom’ and its connection to ‘deeming’ - i.e. judging – has been lost.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[8] Mikhail Bakunin, ‘The Reaction in Germany’, 1842</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[9] For examples see Norman Cohn <em>The Pursuit of the Millennium, </em>Oxford, 1957; Christopher Hill, <em>The World Turned Upside Down, </em>London, 1972.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[10] “Last month, a survey by the market research bureau of Ireland found 87% of the population believe in God. Rather than rocking their faith, 19% said tragedies such as the Asian tsunami, which killed 300,000 people, bolstered their belief.”&nbsp; Ian Sample, ‘Tests of Faith’, <em>The Guardian</em>, February 24th, 2005.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[11] Translated by Alan C.M. Ross, Beacon paperback, Boston, 1968.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[12] first defined by Dionysius Longinus in <em>Peri Hupsous</em> <em>The Art of the Sublime (1st century AD).</em></span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[13] Immanuel Kant, <em>Critique of Judgement </em>(1790), trans, J. H. Bernard, 2nd ed., London, 1931.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[14] Jean Baudrillard ‘Le Transparence: du Mal’ <em>Essais sur les Phenomenes Extreme</em>s, Paris, 1990. Francis Fukuyama, <em>The End of History and the Last Man</em>, New York, 1992.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[15] John Berger 'Keeping a Rendezvous' by, reprinted in <em>The Guardian</em>, Thursday, March 22, 1990</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[16]&nbsp; “ In 1998 a Harris poll found that 66 percent even of non-Christian Americans believed in miracles and 47 percent of them accredited the Virgin Birth; the figures for all Americans are 86 percent and 83 percent respectively.. According to a 1999 Newsweek poll, 40 percent of all Americans (71 percent of Evangelical Protestants) believe that the world will end in a battle at Armageddon between Jesus and the Antichrist.” Tony Judt, ‘Anti-Americans Abroad’ <em>New York</em><em> Review of Books</em>, Issue Volume 50, Number 7, May 1, 2003</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[17] Bob Woodward, <em>Plan of Attack, </em>New York, 2004</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[18]For an example of the fear see Bill Moyers ‘Welcome to Doomsday’, <em>New York Review of Books</em>, Volume 52, Number 5, March 24, 2005. Tim Le Haye interviewed by Morley Safer on <em>60 Minutes II</em>, CBS News, February 8<sup>th</sup> 2004.</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[19] See Gore Vidal, ‘Armageddon?’ <em>Essays 1983-87</em>, London, 1988</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[20]&nbsp; Ronald Asmus, Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia: ‘Power, War, and Public Opinion; Looking behind the Transatlantic Divide’,<em> Policy Review</em>, Number 123, February–March 2004, Hoover Institute</span></p>
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<p><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman', serif;">[21] “The percentage of Americans who believe that success is determined by forces outside their control has fallen from 41 percent in 1988 to 32 percent today; by contrast, the percentage of Germans who believe it has risen from 59 percent in 1991 to 68 percent today.'' From <em>Right Nation,</em> John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, New York, 2004.</span></p>
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<p>&nbsp;</p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>History &amp; Ideas</category>
			<pubDate>Mon, 07 Apr 2003 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>The Work of Art in the Digital Domain</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/technology/item/121-the-work-of-art-in-the-digital-domain</link>
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<p>Plain text beneath the fold</p>
<p><strong>Neither a philosopher, critic nor scholar, somehow Waiter Benjamin (born 15 July 1892) succeeded in being all three at once.His friend Bertolt Brecht called his suicide in 1940</strong></p>
<p><strong>German literature's first great Nazi casualty. Like Brecht, Benjamin was a Marxist, but his writing emerges refreshingly free from dogma. Of all his works, the essay "The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction" (1936) has been the most influential and prescient</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>1. It has entered our lives by stealth. Should Walter Benjamin pop over to your house to celebrate his 100th birthday, you might have difficulty furnishing him with an example of new digital technology. Perhaps you’d point to a video recorder or CD player.&nbsp; He wouldn’t find them totally unfamiliar. In form and function, they seem a natural extension of a 1930s film reel or record collection.&nbsp; More compressed, more attuned, more complex perhaps; but mechanical reproduction all the same.</p>
<p>Under closer scrutiny, however, digital technology is not just more of the same. From photography to sound sampling, book publishing to video editing, fed down phone lines or bounced off satellite dishes, the digital domain translates sound, picture and text into the same binary code. It signals a new kind of production, as well as reproduction.</p>
<p>2. Back in 1936, Benjamin’s essay sketched out a critique of the emerging mass media. Today, multimedia is used to describe the results of digitalisation. Because aural, visual and textual images now can share the same format, different systems can intercommunicate. Moreover, because the information has been encoded, it can be interpreted in new and surprising ways.</p>
<p>An example of this was the release last month of the entire 22 volumes of the Oxford English Dictionary on one CD.</p>
<p>Not only is this a remarkable feat of compression: you no longer have to scan the dictionary, serially, by alphabetical head&shy; word alone. In a few seconds, a standard desktop computer can submit the data to all manner of searches-by date, name, quotation, etymological origin- that would have taken a researcher years of work.</p>
<p>&nbsp;Interactivity is the key development. A glimpse of what this means was given by the launch of Philips CDI, or Interactive Television, earlier this year.&nbsp; Looking like a CD player, it sits under the TV like a video recorder. In fact, CDI is a powerful microcomputer that can grab and manipulate photographs or sound samples, recolour a cartoon, or play one of the projected (but as yet unrealised) interactive films.</p>
<p>3. However, multimedia does not herald a new era. It is best described as a domain. Everything about it confounds the linear concepts of eras, epochs and revolutions.</p>
<p>The format of a CD, for example, unlike vinyl, allows you to skip between tracks, scan forward and back through different sectors. In a similar fashion, digital&nbsp;&nbsp; technology spreads evenly through our lives, sporadically, by incremental shifts.&nbsp; Already, the microchips in an average household television set could talk to the cooker, the sound system, or control the heating. But that does not mean that your home will be run by a massive brain, like Hal the computer who runs amok in Kubrick's film 2001.</p>
<p>The idea of Hal erroneously projects information technology through the prism of an old economic structure. As the growth of personal computers over the past decade has proved, the industry itself proceeds through wider dispersion rather than agglomeration. Its standard model is not the central brain or robot, but the loose, open architecture of the network.</p>
<p>4. Unlike most of the critics and philosophers of his day, Benjamin refused to revile mass production, and' looked for its liberating democratic potential. To him, the new media eroded the possessive&nbsp; fetishism of the art object, and made the <em>work </em>of art, its human significance,&nbsp; more accessible.</p>
<p>The avatars of multimedia would be quick to claim Walter Benjamin for their side. They argue that the digital domain will break the monopolistic stranglehold of the mass media, which separates consumer from producer and makes viewers into passive receivers. Interactivity, they say, reverses the circuit. It requires its audience to participate in choices and makes every receiver poten&shy;tially a transmitter.</p>
<p>5. But Benjamin would also be met by other siren voices. Many of his professed disciples (Hans Magnus Enzensberger, John Berger, Guy Debord, Jean Baudrillard) saw the new technology as an extension of the screen, the spectacle, the simulacra:&nbsp; a further step in the industrialisation of the mind.</p>
<p>Only a fool would accept a fax of a cheque, but multimedia poses similar dilemmas of value and authenticity. Old, mechanically reproduced images at least bear some trace impression of their original. One trusted the token value of a photo of Dietrich or a recording of Gigli, rather as one believed a paper bank note was equivalent to a pound of sterling silver.</p>
<p>The digital image's relation to its original is more like that of a credit card to precious metal: that is, virtually untenable. We have become accustomed to the fact that a new record release no longer reproduces a musician's performance so much as a producer's mix in a multitrack studio. But if we apply the same acceptance to photography? Digital cameras are already on the market, and most news photos are now processed through computer software before publication, where they can be manipulated, figures "air brushed" out, filtered, treated.</p>
<p>The prospect might have disturbed Benjamin. The digital domain seems to yield only images of images. It seems to take us a further remove from reality: deceiving shadows dancing on the walls of our crystal caves.</p>
<p>6. The point is, however, that the camera never told the truth. It lied by framing, crop&shy; ping, choice of caption, by sins of commission or omission. There is no point mourning the decline of the apparent scientific objectivity of the old media. As facts, they were highly factitious.</p>
<p>With the virtue of hindsight, Benjamin would see that mass production did not dispel the bogus religiosity of the work of art. It just replaced the aura of the object with a secondary glamour of the image. Throughout my childhood, film and pop stars attained a god-like status. To see a TV personality in the flesh was as miraculous as meeting an angel.</p>
<p>My two-year-old son, by contrast (thanks to his grandparents' digital camcorder) has al&shy;ready seen himself on TV many times. Per&shy; haps multimedia may yet help to demystify our culture. I doubt the medium will have the hold on his generation it did on mine.</p>
<p>More dramatic still have been the changes in publishing.&nbsp; Not long ago, the honour of being typeset, of "seeing your name in print", conferred real authority. Today, with the relative accessibility of desktop publishing, anyone can produce near typecast quality. If he could look over my shoulder as I write this on my PC now, Benjamin might not be so worried after all.</p>
<p>7. Clearly, the digital domain represents an important new form of production. But what about the other half of the title? Can multi&shy; media really create their own unique works of art?</p>
<p>8. No, they can't! Multimedia is merely the convergence of existing art forms. The digital domain can only reprocess the products of other genres-publishing, music, film - and reissue them at greater cost.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>9. Yes, they can! These new art forms may be stirring already in software publishing, in computer games or virtual reality. As Benjamin noted elsewhere, most new art forms develop, unrecognised, on the unofficial margins of culture.</p>
<p>10. According to Niko Paape, a Dutch interactive designer, the new forms will be almost unrecognisable anyway. For the first time, artworks will be actively created by the spectator (within parameters set by the artist). An interactive picture, for example, may change colour or composition, depending on what clothes the spectator wears, how loud he or she talks.</p>
<p>Clearly this takes the notion that "all art is collaboration" through an unexpected twist If the spectator creates the artwork, who owns the copyright? Such problems of authorship are, of course, only the obsession of an acquisitive individualist culture.</p>
<p>11. Yet why should the new art forms be so radical and progressive? Personal computing promised us a paperless office, but actually increased the amount of paper printed.&nbsp; Paradoxically, given the constant fears about decline of reading (and rise of a three-minute, imagistic culture), multimedia may permit the secret revenge of literacy.</p>
<p>To Benjamin, the great achievement of the era of mechanical reproduction was film, a popular art that spoke in a new demotic language to the masses gathered in the cities.</p>
<p>Compare the gregariousness of the cinema with the solitude of a VDU or interactive TV, and multimedia can seem like a step back&shy; wards. A brief look at the metaphors of the dominant software packages- windows, rooms, desktops- suggests romantic dreaminess and solipsism.</p>
<p>The irony is that digital technology, with its hieroglyphics and clerkist conditions, is overwhelmingly writerly.</p>
<p>12. Yet the digital image has one great flaw, which casts a shadow over its artistic potential. In the first years of the compact disc, many people complained that the aural quality was too bright, almost empty. Even today, I rather like my old vinyl Gigli recording, complete with scratches, pops and hisses. It reminds me that this Italian tenor is singing across great gulfs of years, from the other side of the grave.</p>
<p>Celluloid film - particularly black and white - has the same memorial quality. When you see Casablanca now, you feel nostalgic for those absent faces, that vanished world. Indeed, the elegiac quality of "As Time Goes By' 'was apparent on the day of the film's release. Film, with its shadowy ghostly imagery, closely mimics the tricks of memory. Video tape, by contrast, makes no accommodation with our perception of time. When an episode of Morecambe and Wise is repeated there is something almost obscene about the fact that Eric seems so bright and alive, or that Glenda Jackson looks so young. No matter how vivid the image, it seems to flicker with unreality.</p>
<p>The banal glare of video recordings leads people to assume they are of poorer quality than film. But the opposite is true.&nbsp; Video images are technically perfect. As with most digital forms, errors and distortions would destroy the signal entirely. By virtue of their obsessive perfection, digital images remove the need for imaginative engagement, and deny the central human experience of mortality.</p>
<p>13.&nbsp; Meanwhile, the digital domain marches on. It has been estimated that some 40 per cent of the US economy is now geared to the "soft" production of information and entertainment. At this rate, the old Marxist distinction&nbsp;&nbsp; between&nbsp;&nbsp; base and superstruc&shy;ture, means of production and culture, will fall apart.&nbsp; Ideas and images are becoming the mainstay of the post-industrial economy. What would Benjamin make of this inversion? His resounding exhortation at the conclusion of 'The work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction" was not to aestheticise politics, but to politicise aesthetics.</p>
<p>But hasn't this been largely achieved? Semiotically trained image-consultants advise politicians and&nbsp;&nbsp; corporations. Foucault's dictum "Knowledge is Power" is stencilled on delegates' badges at hairdressing conferences.</p>
<p>14. Yet some of the key ideas Benjamin gleaned from Marx may not be entirely obsolete. In the digital domain, the victors are those who can extract significance from the flood of data. To rephrase a famous line from the Communist Manifesto:&nbsp; the struggle of existing society is the struggle of the classes to become historical (i.e. significant). For the unrepresented and unheard, the constant threat is that they will be drowned out by a rising tide of banality.</p>
<p>Truly politicised aesthetics, in the digital domain, will not be a question of bland slogans and political correctness. It will be a struggle, fought with wit, passion, surprise and guile, to grasp deep meanings without being obscure, to create accessible but captivating images. It will be the labour that Waiter Benjamin embodied in his work, to make, against all odds, a difference.</p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>Technology</category>
			<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jul 1992 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Lorca and Duende</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/culture-a-arts/item/72-theory-and-function-of-duende</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/culture-a-arts/item/72-theory-and-function-of-duende</guid>
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<h2 style="font-size: 1.5em;" mce_style="font-size: 1.5em; ">From&nbsp;<a href="http://www.tonykline.co.uk/PITBR/Spanish/LorcaDuende.htm" mce_href="http://www.tonykline.co.uk/PITBR/Spanish/LorcaDuende.htm" target="_blank">Theory and Function of Duende</a></h2>
<p><img src="http://i39.photobucket.com/albums/e199/peterjukes/stumble%20stuff/Ray12.jpg" width="358" height="258" class="alignleft" style="border-style: initial; border-color: initial; float: left; margin: 7px;" />Once, the Andalusian ‘Flamenco singer’ Pastora Pavon, La Niña de Los Peines, sombre Spanish genius, equal in power of fancy to Goya or Rafael el Gallo, was singing in a little tavern in Cadiz. She played with her voice of shadows, with her voice of beaten tin, with her mossy voice, she tangled it in her hair, or soaked it in&nbsp;<em>manzanilla</em>&nbsp;or abandoned it to dark distant briars. But, there was nothing there: it was useless. The audience remained silent.</p>
<p>In the room was Ignacio Espeleta, handsome as a Roman tortoise, who was once asked: ‘Why don’t you work?’ and who replied with a smile worthy of Argantonius: ‘How should I work, if I’m from Cadiz?’</p>
<p>In the room was Elvira, fiery aristocrat, whore from Seville, descended in line from Soledad Vargos, who in ’30 didn’t wish to marry with a Rothschild, because he wasn’t her equal in blood. In the room were the Floridas, whom people think are butchers, but who in reality are millennial priests who still sacrifice bulls to Geryon, and in the corner was that formidable breeder of bulls, Don Pablo Murube, with the look of a Cretan mask. Pastora Pavon finished her song in silence. Only, a little man, one of those dancing midgets who leap up suddenly from behind brandy bottles, sarcastically, in a very soft voice, said: ‘Viva, Paris!’ as if to say: ‘Here ability is not important, nor technique, nor skill. What matters here is something other.’</p>
<p>Then La Niña de Los Peines got up like a madwoman, trembling like a medieval mourner, and drank, in one gulp, a huge glass of fiery spirits, and began to sing with a scorched throat, without voice, breath, colour, but…with&nbsp;<em>duende</em>. She managed to tear down the scaffolding of the song, but allow through a furious, burning&nbsp;<em>duende</em>, friend to those winds heavy with sand, that make listeners tear at their clothes with the same rhythm as the Negroes of the Antilles in their rite, huddled before the statue of Santa Bárbara.</p>
<p>La Niña de Los Peines had to tear apart her voice, because she knew experts were listening, who demanded not form but the marrow of form, pure music with a body lean enough to float on air. She had to rob herself of skill and safety: that is to say, banish her Muse, and be helpless, so her&nbsp;<em>duende</em>&nbsp;might come, and deign to struggle with her at close quarters...</p>
<p><em>Lorca translation's on this site</em></p>
<p><a href="http://peterjukes.wordpress.com/2009/05/06/the-silent-child/" mce_href="http://peterjukes.wordpress.com/2009/05/06/the-silent-child/">The Silent Child</a></p>
<p><a href="http://peterjukes.wordpress.com/2008/09/28/farewell/" mce_href="http://peterjukes.wordpress.com/2008/09/28/farewell/">Farewell</a></p>
<p><a href="http://peterjukes.wordpress.com/2008/09/09/song-of-the-arid-orange-tree/" mce_href="http://peterjukes.wordpress.com/2008/09/09/song-of-the-arid-orange-tree/">Song of the Arid Orange Tree</a></p>
<p><a href="http://peterjukes.wordpress.com/2008/09/05/every-song/" mce_href="http://peterjukes.wordpress.com/2008/09/05/every-song/">Every Song</a></p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>Culture and Arts</category>
			<pubDate>Mon, 22 Sep 2008 14:02:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Why Britain Can't Do the Wire</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/culture-a-arts/item/63-the-relative-decline-of-british-tv-drama</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/culture-a-arts/item/63-the-relative-decline-of-british-tv-drama</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="K2FeedImage"><img src="http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/media/k2/items/cache/9415f9bcd76598f9c08127db1641b596_S.jpg" alt="Why Britain Can't Do the Wire" /></div><div class="K2FeedIntroText"><p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The critically acclaimed US television drama could not be made here. We have writing talent in abundance, but its output is controlled by a stifling monopoly—the BBC. Plus, an interview with The Wire's creator David Simon</p>
<div class="lead_image"><img class="article_image" src="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/164_jukes.jpg" alt="" width="500" /></div>
<div class="entry"><strong><em>Read <a href="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/10/writing-is-a-team-sport-in-the-us/">Prospect’s interview</a> with The Wire’s creator David Simon, in which he explains why writing is a team sport in the US</em></strong><hr />
<p>It’s been a slow burning fuse. From its first broadcast on the US pay-TV channel HBO in 2002, it took seven years for The Wire to accumulate widespread critical recognition in Britain. And it has grown into something bigger than an artistic success. Like a great Victorian novel, David Simon’s epic portrait of the policing, crime and politics of post-industrial Baltimore is now cited by politicians and leader writers. But the success of this show and a raft of other imports such as The West Wing and Mad Men begs a question about the state of one of our key cultural industries. How come US television drama has captured the high end of the market and we have abandoned it?</p>
</div><div class="K2FeedFullText">
<p>It wasn’t always this way. Although America dominated postwar television drama from Bonanza to Dallas and Dynasty, Britain had a healthy export trade. Till Death us Do Part was transformed into All in the Family, and Monty Python changed US comedy. But our most important impact was not in quantity but quality. Epic historical series such as Jewel in the Crown or experimental melodramas such as Pennies from Heaven set a benchmark for US writers and producers.</p>
<p>But something has happened in the last ten to 15 years. In 1994, I wrote a tribute to Dennis Potter in the New Statesman about the decline of the single authored play on British television. The most obvious cause of this decline was the concentration of commissioning into a few hands. Despite the growth of the independent sector, just four men decided what millions would watch. The difference between 1994 and 2008 is startling. Instead of being the responsibility of four network controllers, most drama is now commissioned by one person.</p>
<p>That person is Ben Stephenson, BBC controller of drama commissioning. He has faced mounting criticism since last year, when he made ill-advised remarks about a “limited pool of talent” for television drama. First to speak out was the former head of drama in Northern Ireland, Robert Cooper, who said that the BBC’s £228m drama budget constitutes a “near monopoly.” A few months later producer Tony Garnett, whose 50-year track record includes launching the careers of Ken Loach and Mike Leigh, accused the BBC of being a cause of its decline, having “hired McKinsey and ended up a McDonald’s.”</p>
<p>But everyone missed the glaring issue: why are these questions being addressed to only one person? In 1994, I worried about the cultural power of four network controllers. Now you can forget Channel 4 and BBC2: they can make decent one-offs, such as Red Riding and Freefall this year, but both have basically dropped out of adult dramas. ITV has fared no better. In the 1990s the powerful baronies of Granada, Yorkshire TV, LWT and Thames had some autonomy. But their amalgamation into one corporation, followed by a catastrophic fall in advertising revenue, has turned ITV drama into a shadow of its former self. Whatever your view of public service broadcasting (and I support it) the near-monopoly of the BBC in drama commissioning is disastrous.</p>
<p>***</p>
<p>One argument used to defend management from this drive to centralisation is, bizarrely, competition. We live in an increasingly competitive multi-channel, multi-platform world they say; the BBC must concentrate its power to survive. Yet across the Atlantic, we see a much more competitive market, with a move to “smarten up” rather than dumb down. The cliché about US television, “160 channels and nothing to watch,” now looks snooty and out of date, at least with drama. Starting with HBO a decade ago, we’ve had The Sopranos, Sex and the City, Six Feet Under—ground-breaking dramas that explored the depths of character and the dynamics of group or family, against the larger context of a city, profession or social milieu.</p>
<p>Not only is the quality of the output high, but so is the diversity of style and genre. This has to be connected to the break-up of the old US network cartel. In the last decade the four major US broadcasters have had stiff competition from free and pay-per-view cable channels, turning US television into a seller’s rather than a buyer’s market. The creative people have more control and the commissioning process is more open. In 2002 an American producer, Anita Addison, saw some episodes of In Deep, a show I had devised for the BBC. She took it to Paramount and they flew me to Los Angeles during the “pitching season.” I went to studios and spoke about my project for 20 minutes. I didn’t need a track record—the presence of a producer, writer and a good idea was enough to have a pilot commissioned.</p>
<p>In Britain, however, the quality of an idea will have little to do with getting a green light. Internal politics and “who’s up and who’s down” will decide. The fate of independent producers is just as bad, turning domestic drama production into a court, with its favourites, intrigues, and sudden disgraces.</p>
<p>One reflex reaction to the decline of British television is to blame it on “chasing the ratings.” But US drama proves that the descent to the lowest common denominator isn’t the only way to get audiences. Nielsen ratings are still king on the major networks, but HBO nurtured The Wire through years of obscurity until it became a hit. With the rise of DVDs and the importance of foreign sales, channels are earning a large proportion of their income from the “long tail.”</p>
<p>In Britain, The Wire was first shown on the FX cable channel in 2005, but BBC2 recently screened all 60 episodes. The fifth series got around 600,000 viewers per episode, 100,000 more than the sitcom that had previously occupied the slot. Total DVD sales for The Wire in Britain are forecast to go past the 1m mark by the end of the year. But to reap these rewards, shows must appeal to the highest common denominator.</p>
<p>The Americans excel at making shows which bear occasional watching, devoted following or repeat viewings. Think of an episode of ER, say, in its heyday. In those 46 minutes there will be teasers and hooks and a strong stand-alone story to keep you gripped through the adverts. But there will also be a syncopated beat of other B and C stories which unfold concurrently (see the diagram on p52), perhaps over several episodes, sometimes over a season or longer. At their best, especially in Mad Men and The Sopranos, US television dramas have evolved into an art form which explores both the inner psyche and the social world continuously but discretely, so that each fragment contains the fractal beauty of the whole.</p>
<p>Apart from a radical restructuring of our own broadcasting industry, what lessons can we take away? The most important, as David Simon points out in the interview (below), is that in US television drama “the writer is God.” This is not because of literary cachet—it’s arisen out of aesthetic, technical and commercial need. Drama is incredibly expensive to make and economies of scale kick in when stories are told over 13 or 24 episodes. They cannot be written by one person alone, nor can they be effectively controlled by studio executives, actors or directors, whose talents by definition lie elsewhere. It requires a team of writers willing to develop character and narrative over a long haul, keeping it focused and fresh. It’s not the writer, singular, who is God in US television drama, but the role of the writer, generic, in the process.</p>
<p>This doesn’t lead to “writing by committee.” My experience is that four minds are four times more inventive in a team than if each works alone. But this requires a conductor to keep the voices to tempo and tune, and the key to this is the showrunner—the head producer who has creative control of the series. Showrunners like David Chase (Sopranos), Steven Bochco (Hill Street Blues) or John Wells (ER) helped carve out a space for collaboration. Time and money is also invested. In the US, beyond your individual scripts, you are paid a salary to come into a “writer’s room” and help the work of others. The Wire is a good example of the result. Conceived by David Simon, a former journalist, and homicide detective Ed Burns, the collaborative ethic allowed them to bring in voices from film writing and crime fiction&shy;—such as Richard Price and George Pelecanos—without losing coherence.</p>
<p>This ethos has made US television the preferred destination for a generation of great writers. After winning an Oscar with American Beauty, Alan Ball eschewed the big screen and created Six Feet Under for HBO. In the DVD commentary to the pilot, he describes handing in the edgy first draft to the head of the channel. Having been through the Hollywood studio mill, Ball expected the worst, but the only note he had back read: “Can you make it more fucked up?”</p>
<p>Although we are blessed with a tradition of great television dramatists, there’s no way that Alan Bleasdale, Dennis Potter or Jimmy McGovern could have written a dozen episodes of a show alone. We have recently imported the idea of showrunners for the resurrection of Dr Who and Survivors, but their power is limited, and the principle of collaboration doesn’t penetrate the lower echelons. Script editors and producers take a dim view of you talking to another writer without tight supervision. There is no financial incentive either. Why make someone else’</p>
<p>s episode great when it might make yours look less good? Given that the running order can be changed at the last moment by management fiat, those collectively crafted character developments and story arcs will be binned anyway. Just write your own episode and cash that cheque.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/wiregraph.gif"><img class="alignleft size-full wp-image-70542" style="border-style: initial; border-color: initial; float: left;" title="wiregraph" src="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/wiregraph.gif" alt="wiregraph" width="480" height="702" /></a></p>
<p>And there is a bigger problem. How can you commission a show if you haven’t defined the metrics of success? Should we be chasing audiences or pleasing regulators? When I started working in television an audience of 10m was deemed a success for BBC1 or ITV primetime drama. Now it’s 5m. Thanks to the growth of DVDs, personal video recorders such as Sky Plus, satellite, digital, online and on-demand services, the broadcast network can no longer monopolise home entertainment and the audience are leaving en masse. The worst thing to do at such a moment is to play safe—yet that has been the tactic of British television drama. It’s understandable that ITV cuts everything to the bone except Emmerdale and Coronation Street—they need the advertising revenue. After The X-Factor, these soaps are the channel’s best performers, bringing in audiences of around 7m and 9m respectively. But why does the BBC devote most of its drama budget to three soaps: EastEnders, Casualty and Holby City?</p>
<p>Tony Garnett calls this a “dereliction” and the output “formulaic, repetitive, machine driven, emotionally dishonest junk.” Having worked on that assembly line, I can only concur. I wrote a season opener to the hospital drama Holby City before it became a soap, to prove myself “by ordeal” as a BBC writer. For my sins, I got involved in two more episodes which count as the most dispiriting experiences in my 25 years as a dramatist. Soaps squeeze the creativity and innovation out of you. Your characters will be controlled by a remorseless weekly production machine, subject to the whims of its personnel, or the unavailability of an actor. Your dialogue, mainly confected out of procedural clichés anyway, will be rewritten in-house. A producer may send you a script the day before shooting begins with the instruction to turn it around overnight and “make it funnier” or “more in your voice.” It’s a paradox of our public service broadcasting that soaps are primetime viewing here, while on US television they are a daytime interest. Soaps lock us into 1960s kitchen-sink naturalism and outdated platitudes of class, character and aspiration. In comparison, the inventiveness of Potter or Bleasdale looks like it comes from a different age, and the hyper-realism of The Wire from another planet. Even a middlebrow US drama such as Damages, set in a law firm, takes risks with form: dream and fantasy sequences, montages, flashforwards, flashbacks. It plays with genre and expectation, and its anti-hero, played by Glenn Close, provides a compelling portrait of the contradictions of character.</p>
<p>One response to all this is to admit defeat. Why should we dream of competing with the US? We should accept that we no longer punch above our weight and resign ourselves to being a medium-sized country with limited aspirations.</p>
<p>But our dramatic talent is still flourishing elsewhere. Our reality television formats dominate (or is that tyrannise?) US primetime. In comedy, the US version of The Office is a success, and the edgy improvisational style of The Thick of It inspires envy. And our actors and directors pick up Oscars and Golden Globes, as do our screenwriters such as Ronald Harwood, Peter Morgan and Simon Beaufoy. All three were trained in television drama. Could they, like Alan Ball, be enticed back to the small screen in Britain? I doubt it.</p>
<p>Any sector that has lost both market share and talent at such a rapid rate as British television drama should start examining its practices. Drama is about dialogue, opposing points of view, clashing perspectives. Any structure that diminishes this diversity undermines the basis of the form.</p>
<p>Last year Ben Stephenson’s predecessor Jane Tranter, who until recently was BBC controller of fiction (yes, all BBC fiction), gave a speech about drama at the Royal Television Society awards. She spoke of the role of the executive: “In the modern world of endless media possibilities we can help a drama to succeed by encouraging it to be succinct, to declare its intent, to make its premise clear… ensuring that the heart of the drama is not only true, but is not opaquely or perversely hidden.” I came across her speech as I was reading Stephen Greenblatt’s essay on Hamlet, which demonstrates how Shakespeare added a “wilful obscurity” to the original tragedy to increase its emotional power and depth. I couldn’t help feeling Tranter’s stand was a misunderstanding of what drama is, what a writer does, and what the audience wants.</p>
<p>If writers knew in advance, with no opacity or perversity, what the true heart of a drama was, they wouldn’t bother to write it. If this principle of “making the premise clear” had been applied to The Singing Detective or Edge of Darkness, let alone Twin Peaks or Lost, none of them would have been made. More importantly, if the audience is held by the hand and told where they are going, they will go elsewhere, abandoning the programmatic and obvious for the unpredictable, dark hearts of Tony Soprano or David Simon’s Baltimore.</p>
</div></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>Culture and Arts</category>
			<pubDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2009 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Flaming for Obama</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/politics/item/62-primary-war-on-the-left-blogosphere</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/politics/item/62-primary-war-on-the-left-blogosphere</guid>
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<p><span style="font-weight: bold;" mce_style="font-weight:bold;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: normal;" mce_style="font-weight: normal; "><img src="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp-content/themes/prospect/images/titleMain.png" mce_src="http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp-content/themes/prospect/images/titleMain.png" /></span></span></p>
<p>I’ve spent much of the last year on the front line of one of the most contentious presidential nomination contests in memory—without moving from my London desk. I have been part of something historic: the first great political battle to take place in cyberspace.</p>
<p>For many in Britain, blogging, especially political blogging, is a bit of a disappointment. Many of our political sites are tacked on to party websites, or are simply online versions of established media outlets. They tend to be either controlled, conformist and rather dull, or unmoderated rants, the kind of online graffiti rightly parodied by Private Eye.</p>
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<p>The US offers a glimpse of something different—how the internet can transform news and opinion. It is ten years since the <a href="http://www.drudgereport.com/" mce_href="http://www.drudgereport.com/">Drudge Report</a> broke the Lewinsky scandal. These days, American sites like <a href="http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/" mce_href="http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/">Talking Points Memo</a>, Politico and (as Andrew Keen <a href="http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=10312" mce_href="http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=10312">described</a> in the August issue of Prospect) the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/" mce_href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/">Huffington Post</a> regularly scoop the conventional media by hours, or even days.</div><div class="K2FeedFullText"></p>
<p>But what is happening now is more profound than a digital acceleration of the news cycle. The social networking craze best known through websites such as Facebook and MySpace has spilled over into politics, giving birth to an online form of grassroots activism, which includes campaigning, fundraising and advocacy—a movement known in the US as the “netroots”—some of it linked to mainstream parties (and their factions) some of it independent. Although Republicans are active in this area too—many attribute Bush’s 2004 victory to an email database that activated right-wing votes—it is with the liberal/progressive netroots that the political blogosphere has come of age.</p>
<p>By 2007, the annual Netroots Nation conference had become such a key event in the Democratic calendar that it was attended by all the presidential candidates (bar Joe Biden). When the scandal of John Edwards’s affair erupted a couple of months ago, it was on the most visited progressive site, Daily Kos, that Edwards’s wife Elizabeth released her <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/8/8/193337/7354/473/564989" mce_href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/8/8/193337/7354/473/564989">public statement</a> in response, and then replied to comments from some of the site’s 100,000 active members. More practically, congressional candidates regularly contribute to netroots sites to argue their cases, rally support and, most importantly, raise money.</p>
<p>The seeds of this can be traced back to 1998, when <a href="http://www.moveon.org/" mce_href="http://www.moveon.org/">moveon.org</a> was formed in response to Bill Clinton’s impeachment proceedings. In their first decade, the progressive netroots have focused on activism and single issues: getting out the vote (especially in swing states), raising money for favoured candidates and opposing the Iraq war. The first major electoral impact came in 2006, with the drafting of two Senate candidates: Jim Webb, who displaced the incumbent Virginia Republican George Allen thanks partly to a viral video promoted on the blogosphere showing Allen making racist remarks, and Howard Lamont, who defeated Joe Lieberman in a Connecticut primary.</p>
<p>Given the demographics of early internet use, this new <a href="http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060814/melber" mce_href="http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060814/melber">digital constituency</a> was largely liberal, educated, opinionated and quick to pull out the credit card. Howard Dean was the first presidential candidate to recognise the potential; his 2004 bid was centred on using the web to galvanise Democrats and create new coalitions, even in states long considered lost to the Republicans. But it was the Obama campaign that really capitalised on the phenomenon, deploying it to key advantage in Obama’s shock primary wins in January and February 2008. Money was a big part of it. Instead of relying on large donors and fundraising dinners, <a href="http://my.barackobama.com" mce_href="http://my.barackobama.com">my.barackobama.com</a> gathered 2m small contributors who could donate small amounts on the website again and again without breaching their $2,500 contribution cap. As a result, Obama consistently outraised Hillary Clinton, despite lacking her media profile and traditional Democratic donor base.</p>
<p>Television and radio coverage—”airwave supremacy”—has been the key to a successful presidential campaign ever since the Nixon/Kennedy clash in 1960. But in politics, just as in other fields, the internet has changed the way professionals communicate with the public, and the way the public communicates with itself. In the years ahead, many of the biggest political conflicts will be fought in cyberspace. And what we saw in the Democratic primaries this year was the fiercest sort of battle there is: a civil war.</p>
<p><img src="http://prospect-magazine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/import/my_story_jukes.jpg" mce_src="http://prospect-magazine.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/import/my_story_jukes.jpg" alt="" style="margin-bottom: 10px; margin-left: 10px;" mce_style="margin-bottom:10px;margin-left:10px;" align="right" border="0" />I first immersed myself in the liberal blogosphere during John Kerry’s bid to unseat Bush in 2004, mainly through my fascination for polls, opinions and analysis. The slow death of local Labour party activism in Britain had left me with an unsatisfied craving for political dispute. There were also personal reasons: my partner then had been a White House Fellow during 9/11, I had lived in a number of US cities and was a member of several transatlantic groups.</p>
<p>During the 2008 campaign, I found breaking news more quickly on the netroots sites than I could on CNN, and analysis better than anything in the New York Times or the Washington Post. By following sites like <a href="http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/" mce_href="http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/">fivethirtyeight.com</a> and <a href="http://www.openleft.com" mce_href="http://www.openleft.com">OpenLeft</a>, it became clear to me after “super Tuesday” in early February that the underlying mathematics of the primaries meant Obama was likely to become the Democratic candidate—no matter how much the media dressed up the campaign as a close-fought race with Hillary.</p>
<p>However, in the end it wasn’t the analysis that hooked me, it was the polemic. I became addicted to websites like <a href="http://www.dailykos.com" mce_href="http://www.dailykos.com">Daily Kos</a> or <a href="http://www.mydd.com" mce_href="http://www.mydd.com">MyDD</a> (short for My Due Diligence), where one could get stuck in to detailed and fiery political argument. MyDD—which Daily Kos credits as its “blogfather”—was founded in 2001 by Jerome Armstrong, a 37-year-old former environmental activist, as a wonkish, mainly pro-Howard Dean blog. A year later, one of Armstrong’s writers, a former Republican called Markos Moulitsas Zuniga, left to set up Daily Kos. Armstrong and Zuniga apparently remained friends, and in 2006, as the patriarchs of the liberal blogosphere, co-authored the key book on the movement, Crashing the Gate. This argued that the bottom-up approach of the netroots was the only way out of the fractious and lobbyist-heavy impasse of Democratic politics. The old rainbow coalition had fragmented into a myriad of special interest groups, often at odds with each other. This lack of coherence turned candidates into easy prey for paid lobbyists and pressure groups, encouraging the notorious legislative gridlock of Washington.</p>
<p>On first view, websites like Daily Kos and MyDD may look like simple news providers, but underneath they are powered by a specific community and its democratic preferences. Soon after joining, you can write your own piece, or “diary.” With enough interest from other users, your diary can rise quickly up the recommended list or “rec list” until you are ushered on to the front page. In their comments, other readers can annotate and correct your piece, provide new links and background, “flame” you with insults, heap you with praise or just crack a joke. These comments are themselves subject to voting. The more votes you acquire the more privileges you get—a privileged user can, for example, hide the abusive or unsubstantiated comments they receive from others. Becoming a member of these sites is like joining the editorial board of an interactive newspaper or, with the increased popularity of embedded YouTube videos, the news team of a television network.</p>
<p>A few years ago, the idea that an open-source system could generate reliable content was not taken that seriously. But look at <a href="http://www.wikipedia.org/" mce_href="http://www.wikipedia.org/">Wikipedia</a> now. It may still have doubters, but it is increasingly regarded as a valid work of reference. The same is becoming true in the political blogosphere. Providing these sites are well moderated, most unsourced rumours and poorly argued rants get weeded out, and quality flourishes. You have to sift and filter, helped by other users, but at their best these sites can achieve a depth and speed of political coverage you cannot find anywhere else. For example, within minutes of Sarah Palin’s appointment as John McCain’s running mate in late August, bloggers were providing a more thorough “vetting” of her background than the Republican party, and the mainstream media were following their lead.</p>
<p>***</p>
<p>By the 2008 primaries, the influence of the netroots had become apparent. John Edwards was briefly the darling of the movement. But after Obama’s “yes we can” speech in New Hampshire, a split emerged—one which was to characterise the rest of the primary campaign. Kos became the base for enthusiastic—sometimes overenthusiastic—Obama support. And when Edwards dropped out at the end of January, the rush to Obama became a flood. Tensions rose, especially between the generations. Hillary supporters found themselves an unwelcome minority on Daily Kos, and their comments and diaries were full of attacks on Obama, whose supporters they called “juvenile Obamabots.” Because of its predominantly orange design, Daily Kos became known as the “Big Orange Satan” by Hillary supporters.</p>
<p>Led by a prolific diarist known as Alegre, several Clintonistas announced a writers’ “<a href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/3/14/20827/4727/132/476843" mce_href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/3/14/20827/4727/132/476843">strike</a>” on Daily Kos and migrated to MyDD, where Jerome Armstrong, who had long been an Obama sceptic, finally became a vocal supporter of Hillary’s. This surprised many, especially since key figures in Hillary’s campaign, like Mark Penn and Terry McAuliffe, seemed to stand for exactly the old politics that Crashing the Gate rejected. But in a hotly contested two-horse race, it made little political or commercial sense to have two pro-Obama blogs. As traffic hotted up during the protracted campaign, Markos and Jerome were each carving out their own domains in the blogosphere.</p>
<p>My involvement in the 2008 campaign became personal when a good friend was appointed a senior policy adviser to the Obama campaign. I followed the netroots sites closely, and in March, when Clinton’s campaign began its “kitchen sink offensive,” I began to post diaries. For a writer in search of an audience, a site like Daily Kos—with over 100,000 active members and more than 20m page views a week—was a big draw. The effect was addictive. When <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/3/31/182127/398/320/487834" mce_href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/3/31/182127/398/320/487834">a diary</a> I wrote about Hillary’s false recollections of Tuzla in 1996—in which I believe I coined the phrase “Snipergate”—got to the top of the rec list, I felt like Woodward or Bernstein.</p>
<p>But although I was a firm Obama supporter, I soon began to find Daily Kos a bit boring, an echo chamber rather than a place for debate. I wanted to be on the front line, and soon the Clintonista MyDD was my most visited website. I found a site dominated by “gates”: Naftagate, Monstergate and Bittergate, but above all Wrightgate—the tarring of Obama with the inflammatory sermons of his preacher Jeremiah Wright. The MyDD rec list became a compilation of the worst smears and innuendoes about Obama, led by the former veteran of Daily Kos, or “Kossack,” Alegre, and supported by other female diarists such as Texas Darlin or Linfar.</p>
<p>I relished these flame wars. They sharpened my polemical skills: soon I was picking off weak arguments and logical fallacies, and applying “Godwin’s law,” which states that in any debate, whoever invokes Hitler first loses the argument. This was useful during the row over whether Michigan and Florida’s disbarred votes should in fact be counted.</p>
<p>There is, of course, an intrinsic problem with online advocacy, especially when contributors hide behind sobriquets or “handles.” Hurriedly typed text lacks tone and context, and it’s easy to take offence where none is intended. This became all the more divisive during the primary wars because they tapped back into the identity politics that had been so potent in the last century. With two exceptional candidates—one female, one black—with very similar policy platforms, the arguments quickly became personal. Many contributors assumed that anyone who disagreed with them was either racist or sexist, depending on which candidate they backed. On progressive websites, these accusations, even when only implied, were explosive.</p>
<p>The battles soon fell into a familiar pattern. A lead diarist would find some new Obama gaffe or link to a news story, often on a right-wing site like Fox News. The diary would be recommended by the diarist’s fans. Obama supporters would gather round to try to take the diarist down, only to be blocked by the majority Clintonista members. Sometimes the allegations were completely ridiculous: “<a href="http://www.mydd.com/story/2008/5/15/121720/945" mce_href="http://www.mydd.com/story/2008/5/15/121720/945">Sweetiegate</a>,” for instance, when Obama was accused of misogyny for calling a reporter “sweetie,” or “<a href="http://www.mydd.com/story/2008/4/18/102120/357" mce_href="http://www.mydd.com/story/2008/4/18/102120/357">Fingergate,</a>” where an odd-angled snapshot made it appear as if he were giving Hillary the finger.</p>
<p>By late April, with the primaries heading into Obama-unfriendly Pennsylvania and West Virginia, the home of what Hillary called “hard-working… white Americans”—it seemed as if the Democratic party was ruining its best shot at the presidency for years, reverting to its famed role as a “circular firing squad.” Some more senior Obama supporters started trying to rebuild the burnt bridges to Hillary fans. In turn, some of her best advocates returned the compliment. For a moment it looked as if the flame wars were about to fizzle out. But there turned out to be a third party with an interest in keeping them burning.</p>
<p>***</p>
<p>Ever since online bulletin boards took off in the 1990s, there have been users whose sole aim is to disrupt the online conversation. These so-called “trolls” sow dissent, confusion and misunderstanding. In the 2008 presidential campaign, the relatively early nomination of John McCain presented Republican trolls with the perfect opportunity to attack the Democrats. In February, with Obama apparently on course for victory, the right-wing “shock jock” Rush Limbaugh launched “Operation Chaos,” urging Republicans to register as Democrats and vote for Hillary in order to deepen the rancour in Democratic ranks. Meanwhile, McCain’s team encouraged supporters to fight for their nominee online. Republican trolls arrived at MyDD aiming to fan hostility between the Democratic rivals. Sometimes they would pose as extreme Obama supporters, and tarnish both him and the Clintons by resurrecting some of the nastier smears on Bill and Hillary from the 1990s. But more often they pretended to be Hillary supporters, claiming that “Barack Hussein Obama” was a corrupt, anti-American black separatist.</p>
<p>Troll-hunters sprang up in response, looking for signs of right-wing agitation, like quotes from Fox News. Others were better at weeding out trolls than I was, but I still notched up a few scalps. Some couldn’t resist telling me what they were up to, which of course was completely stupid, saying things like, “We’ll be back in four months’ time. Then we’ll really have some fun!” And I did get “Universal,” the bane of all Obama supporters, to all but confess that he was a troll. He’d written an absurd diary on “Professorgate”: the charge that Obama’s résumé falsely claimed he had been a Chicago law professor. I suggested that Universal was playing a clever game: deliberately causing dissension to increase MyDD’s page hits and advertising revenues. Flattered, he said I was right about his tactics, just wrong about his motives. The next day he was outed as a Republican and banned from MyDD forever.</p>
<p>Republican trolls often had multiple accounts, recommending their own diaries and rating their own comments. Democrats of both persuasions occasionally formed joint patrols to hunt them down. We would meet their provocative comments simply by posting long recipes, or “Don’t feed the troll” signs, or pictures of cats in various absurd positions (so-called “lolcats”) or even photographs of comic slapstick errors with the word FAIL in bold letters.</p>
<p>It may seem puerile, but by then the primaries themselves had descended into farce—partly because the old “made for television” politics no longer worked in the digital age. This is something Armstrong foresaw in Crashing the Gate, arguing that the old Karl Rove-Dick Morris days of mass media campaigns were over. The Clintonite tactic of triangulation wouldn’t play in the internet age. Saying one thing to one electorate and another thing to another was viable in an age of local radio, television and newspapers. But with Google and YouTube, where every archived interview and campaign speech is just a click away, the contradictions could be burrowed out, held up and shown to be cynical and manipulative.</p>
<p>***</p>
<p>The paradox of the netroots is that for all their bottom-up inclusiveness, these sites are run by sole proprietors—Armstrong on the pro-Hillary MyDD, Markos on the Obama backing Daily Kos—the rock stars of the liberal blogosphere. The economics of the web means that clickthrough ad revenue, driven by visitor numbers, is the main source of funding. (Based on a rough estimate of traffic and Google ad rates, Daily Kos could be earning almost $1m a year through advertising.) As with early rock stars, the balance between driving up commercial success and retaining authenticity is proving hard to pull off.</p>
<p>The result is an uneasy mix of democratic collectivism and Rupert Murdoch-style autocracy. In April, I became a direct victim of this tension in the furore over Obama’s remarks at a private fundraiser in San Francisco about voters who “cling to guns or religion.” Seeing a new front opening, Hillary’s campaign launched the classic Nixonian attack: Obama was an elitist. Blog posts were fired off almost minute by minute. Obama diarists now said that MyDD stood for “<a href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/4/1/175549/6602/717/488478" mce_href="http://www.dailykos.com/story/2008/4/1/175549/6602/717/488478">My Dixiecrat</a>“—a reference to the old racist southern Democrats. A diary by the truculent journalist Bob Johnson, “<a href="http://www.mydd.com/story/2008/4/1/105757/2453" mce_href="http://www.mydd.com/story/2008/4/1/105757/2453">MyDD—the Cesspool of Hate</a>,” actually reached the top of the MyDD rec list.</p>
<p>The Obamabots seemed to be winning the argument. But then came what I call the Battle of Bob Johnson Bridge. Johnson wrote <a href="http://www.mydd.com/story/2008/4/30/123917/817" mce_href="http://www.mydd.com/story/2008/4/30/123917/817">a diary</a> on MyDD suggesting that Women’s Voices, Women’s Vote, a Democratic organisation with a lot of Hillary backers, might be colluding in voter suppression prior to the North Carolina primary—tactics designed to reduce the turnout for Obama supporters. The diary was contentious but sourced, and I recommended it. Hours later, the diary suddenly disappeared from the rec list, and those who had recommended it had their posting and commenting privileges removed. In response, I wrote one of my first diaries on MyDD, asking if censorship was taking place, and whether this violated the community principles of netroots. Within minutes, I noticed the tags “whiny meta-diary” had been added to my post. I tried to correct them, but could no longer log on. I’d been <a href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/5/1/25143/93090/754/5" mce_href="http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2008/5/1/25143/93090/754/5">banished</a> from MyDD.</p>
<p>Armstrong’s mass cullings of pro-Obama contributors were commercially smart. MyDD had greatly increased its traffic since it became the front line of the primary wars. By suspending Obamabots, Armstrong ensured the Clintonistas still dominated, while hanging on to his more passive Obama-supporting readers who wanted to follow the story. But such heavy-handed actions raise uncomfortable questions for a movement whose credibility rests on its open, grassroots approach to democracy.</p>
<p>***</p>
<p>By early June, Obama’s drip-drip of superdelegates and endorsements had become a rush. Under a new samizdat sobriquet (or what is known as a “sockpuppet”) I wrote a <a href="http://www.mydd.com/story/2008/5/18/8648/28458" mce_href="http://www.mydd.com/story/2008/5/18/8648/28458">pro-Clinton diary</a> on MyDD saying that although Hillary had lost the nomination, she had broken the glass ceiling and taken over the Clinton brand from Bill. This had an unexpected effect. Arianna Huffington cited my diary in <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/hillary-clintons-defeat-a_b_102418.html" mce_href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arianna-huffington/hillary-clintons-defeat-a_b_102418.html">a front page piece</a> on the Huffington Post, and MyDD gave me my privileges back.</p>
<p>The next few weeks were probably the most extraordinary of the whole campaign. Although there were still flare-ups, both sides sought reconciliation. Thanks to the Clintonistas, I learned Postel’s law—the most important lesson of all when it comes to debate with online strangers. Devised by one of the founders of the internet, Postel’s law is a rule of systems communication which also applies in debate: “be conservative about what you send, and liberal about what you receive.” Write with discipline, listen with tolerance. It’s a good rule for bloggers.</p>
<p>Of course, it wasn’t all happy endings after Hillary conceded. MyDD’s headline diarists disappeared and set up their own minority sites. Alegre tried to form a pro-Hillary putsch of delegates at the Denver Democratic convention. Texas Darlin, having offered a $1m reward for a mythical tape of Michelle Obama using the word ‘”whitey,” is now pushing some theory about Obama having a fake birth certificate. Some dead-enders formed a group called Puma (Party Unity My Ass) vowing to vote for McCain so that Hillary can run in 2012.</p>
<p>In just a few years, the netroots have shown how a myriad of single-issue causes can coalesce and play a pivotal role in the Democratic primaries. In the future, with the decline of the traditional political party branch meeting, union meeting or fundraising event, it could be the model for new forms of engagement. Watch this (virtual) space.</p>
<p>There is nothing in Britain that replicates the passion and activism of these sites. The nearest equivalent is ConservativeHome—and perhaps it is no surprise that an opposition party latches on to this alternative form of communication. I still wait for real signs of a popular centre-left blog in Britain. (If you want to start one up, let me know.)</p>
<p>In the meantime, some flaming occasionally flares on Daily Kos, led mainly by so-called purity trolls disappointed at Obama’s shift to the centre. MyDD has fewer diaries, and the comments are less rapid and intense. But another round of Republican trolls has moved into this vacuum (they came back in the summer just as they promised), and as a result a joint band of Obamaites and Clintonistas have had enough. They’re forming a new progressive blog called <a href="http://www.motleymoose.com" mce_href="http://www.motleymoose.com">Motley Moose</a> to provide a troll-free and properly moderated site in which to roam—and they want me to join them!</p>
<p>After the party conventions, the ad hominems are flying again. Is Sarah Palin a legitimate target of attack, or a victim of sexism? Ouch. I’ve just had my first flame. We’re arguing, cracking jokes, posting videos… back in the thick of it.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><span mce_style="font-weight:bold;" style="font-weight: bold;">Click&nbsp;</span><a hrefundefined="" mce_hrefundefined="" mce_style="font-weight:bold;" data-mce-hrefundefined="" style="font-weight: bold;">here</a>&nbsp;<span mce_style="font-weight:bold;" style="font-weight: bold;">to discuss this piece at First Drafts, Prospect’s blog</span></p>
</div></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>Politics</category>
			<pubDate>Thu, 16 Oct 2008 09:38:00 +0000</pubDate>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>Getting the Bug</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/technology/item/58-book-review-of-virtual-realities-and-cyberpunk</link>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/technology/item/58-book-review-of-virtual-realities-and-cyberpunk</guid>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="K2FeedIntroText"><p><img src="http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/510W8e2SrEL.jpg" width="200" style="float: left; margin: 5px;" />&nbsp;There’s a nasty bug doing the rounds. Like a computer virus it occupies apparently innocuous spaces, then starts replicating itself at amazing speed spawning logical contradictions that eventually bring the system shuddering to a halt. Fortunately, the symptoms are easy to spot. If words like ‘seduction’ ‘simulation’, ‘decentred individual’ and ‘posthumanism’ randomly flash across the page, you know you’ve found the bug of post modernism.</p>
<p>Neither Mark Dery’s&nbsp;Escape Velocity nor Shelly Turkle’s&nbsp;‘Life on the Screen’ are free from this virulent force. Both claim to explore the cultural impact of the ‘digital revolution’, and yet rely on the prescriptions of Baudrillard, Jameson and Lacan - theorists who main contributions were relevant to the&nbsp;mass media of ten or twenty years ago, rather than the&nbsp;multimedia industry today.</p>
<p></div><div class="K2FeedFullText">Escape Velocity is the most rampantly affected, even though it claims to be the most radical and cutting-edge. One of the most startling effects of digital technology is how it pervading so much of our everyday activities of work, play, communication and learning. But shunning the ordinary, Dery takes the ‘alternative’ route in search of extraordinary ‘subcultures’ and ‘countercultures’. His book unfolds as a freak show, a parade of cyberpunk novelists, cybersex enthusiasts, technopagans, cyber rockers and underground roboticists. It adheres to the old and easily questionable post-modern assumption that the more outlandish, marginal, bizarre the phenomenon, the more socially significant it is.</p>
<p>As a result,&nbsp;Escape Velocity has a tendency to fall into the formal style of a telephone directory: since every manifestation is potentially important, nothing can be left out. From nanotechnology to neural networks, safe sex to smart drugs, Dery connects the most diverse and spurious. There is, despite all this, a unifying element. His argument is that new technologies are changing the way we configure our consciousness to our bodies and all the other objects around.</p>
<p>Though he swings from the utopian to the apocalyptic, Dery is really only repeating something Marshall McCluhan observed forty years ago: technology extends the range of our physical control and mental awareness. But in doing so, we make a psychic exchange with inorganic matter. We become less animated as the objects we make become more and more alive.</p>
<p>The only problem with the formulation is that it is hardly new (Humphrey Jennings applied it to the Industrial Revolution in&nbsp;Pandemonium) and so undermines Dery’s decision to select his subjects for their sensational news value. He often cites Hans Moravec’s belief that one day we will be able to ‘download’ our minds entirely onto some trillion terabyte computer hard disk. - but this is just another manifestation of the ancient desire to turn ourselves into monuments, epitaphs or statues, a ‘sundering of body from consciousness’ which Walter Benjamin once wrote is inherent in the act of writing itself.</p>
<p>For all the new technology of its subject matter,&nbsp;Escape Velocity is still working in the old technology of text, and it is in verbal texture of the book that the biggest problem real lies. Every sentence is spiked with a ‘cyberdelic’ buzz words and neologisms. Technical terms swiftly transform into metaphors and back again (like the title of the book), confusing clear or sustained argument.</p>
<p>Post modernists may claim that Dery is just making clear the innate ‘opacity’ of the language. But surely even opacity can have its shades and contrasts. Too often Dery’s insights get hi-jacked by his style. At one point,&nbsp;Escape Velocities shows the similarity between the technological visions of McCluhan and the theology of Teilhard de Chardin: a fusion of mysticism and machinery which Dery calls ‘techno-paganism’. But whereas he might have connected this to wider social trends (e.g., the growth of sci-fi religions like Scientology) Dery ends up watching a performance artist practice some new kind of body piercing. It’s cool. It’s shocking. And largely irrelevant - like a bad day at the ICA.</p>
<p>At least Shelly Turkle’s&nbsp;Life on the Screen is not just devoted to the folly of the few, and attempts to explore how the growing presence of personal computers has affected the follies of the many. The best passages in Turkle’s work are drawn from her own researches. Over the last decade, she has interviewed hundreds of men, women and children who use digital technology as everyday practitioners rather than performance artists.</p>
<p>Life on the Screen explores many of the same premises as&nbsp;Escape Velocity - especially how the development of smart machines has affected our idea of what it is to be human. But Turkle pursues these premise through a very different route. Through asking children of different ages (and in different cultures) whether an interactive computer program is ‘alive’ or not, she reveals how quickly children learn the difference between simulation and reality. The fact that computer programs are becoming increasingly sophisticated and apparently ‘intelligent’ does not seem to instill these children with any fear that computers will one day think for themselves and take over the world (like the malevolent ‘Net’ in the&nbsp;Terminator movies) Significantly, they have revised their ideas of what it is to be alive and human beyond the mere ability to process logical commands. They help define their humanity by seeing what a computer cannot do: breath, feel or imagine.</p>
<p>It is the normality of Turkle’s approach that actually makes it a more profound piece of cultural criticism. There are elements of the freak show, especially with her emphasis of t fantasy role playing and gender bending in Multi-User Dungeons - online interactive games. Yet even here, Turkle avoids the sensationalism of virtual murder and rape. She compares the stories of two inhibited lonely men who played obsessively for several hours a day, adopting different roles in online charades. For one, it became an unhealthy addiction - a way of acting out his fantasies of power and revenge. For another it became a way of working them out.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, despite long sections where Turkle makes the digital domain both understandable and real, there are also chapters cluttered with apologies for the intellectual mentors of her student days. Hours of valuable processing time are wasted on Lacan, Deleuze, Guattari and the circularities of post modern theory. Without this virus on her hard disk, Turkle’s distinction between a culture of calculation and a culture of simulation - a distinction that largely covers the change from the centralized, inaccessible mainframes of the 70s, and the colorful user-friendly PCs of the 90s - would be perfectly acceptable. But by adding the key word ‘simulation’, the dormant bug is triggered, and what was initially just a suggestive observation mutates into ideological position, then into a sprawling series of self-justifications.</p>
<p><em>Book review for New Statesman April 1996</em></p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>Technology</category>
			<pubDate>Sat, 20 Apr 1996 00:55:00 +0000</pubDate>
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			<title>Crawling out of the Swamp</title>
			<link>http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/essays-blogs-journalism/technology/item/57-video-games-and-early-cinema</link>
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<p>It may mark the end of culture as we know it. The sideshows are raucous and sensational. They revolve around puerile fantasies of sex and aggression, horror and sleaze. They are also highly addictive. Something in their flickering imagery mesmerises the young (in some cases inducing fits) resulting in short attention spans, truancy, and an explosion of juvenile crime.</p>
<p><img style="margin: 5px; float: left;" src="http://www.peterjukes.com/joomla3/images/M_images/zoe.jpg" alt="zoe" width="263" height="170" /></p>
<div>No, these comments aren't inspired by the video-game arcade. They are, in fact, some typical reactions to the early days of another popular amusement, another cave of dreams - the cinema. It is nearly a hundred years since Auguste and Louis Lumière first unveiled their cinematograph in the basement of the Grand Café. For nearly three decades after the form was treated with the same alarm and suspicion that Sega and Nintendo arouse now: a peep show in a penny arcade, a bastard offshoot of vaudeville and music-hall, low-life entertainment, almost underground. Well after Eisenstein and Griffith had proved cinema's artistic potential, social commentators were still worrying 'What the Films are doing to Young America'. Now that film has been acknowledged as 'the art form of the 20th century' could computer games follow the precedent? Could their lurid virtual worlds become the art form of the 21st?</div>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><br />Initial comparisons are promising. Like early film, interactive games have become an unpredicted commercial success. In a few years, Sega and Nintendo have amassed a four to five billion dollar annual turnover, capturing some two-thirds of the recorded music market, a quarter of the entertainments industry as a whole. Just as cinema emerged from the protozoic soup of 19th century technology: Fantascopes, Zoopraxiscopes, Kinetoscopes, Zoetrope, Vitascopes, today's interactive media betray a similar proliferation of proprietorial formats. In the last year, in the compact disc market alone, Sega has launched the Mega-CD, Amiga the CD-TV, Philips CD-I. In a market teeming with life, natural selection is already in progress. Some of these mutations will be unviable: others might only last of few years. But among them, crawling out of the swamp, might be the prototype of a new medium destined to colonise the earth.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">One proof will be the fear and loathing the new arrival attracts. Writing about film in&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">The Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical Reproduction</span> Walter Benjamin noted how new art forms initially appear brash and monstrous. They have, by necessity, to shake traditions, offend older sensibilities. Video games certainly fulfil this brief. Witness the uproar that has attended the proposed release of&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Night Trap</span> for the Sega Mega-CD. The game is billed as an 'interactive movie' in which - among other things - you have to rescue some semi-naked women from a lurking alien threat.&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Night Trap</span> was one of the first computer games to be referred to British Board of Film Censors (where it was awarded a 15 certificate). By video standards, the content was mild. But the disproportionate outrage just adds to the medium's credentials. As Malcolm McClaren has pointed out: if you want to rebel against your parents, the last thing you'll play is loud rock and roll. If you really want to get them worried, go and play a computer game.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">Something strange has happened to the great microchip revolution. Cheap computer processing was supposed to bring us smart TVs and digital organisers, put the sophistication of a graphics workstation, recording studio and typesetting shop within everyone's reach. Through the home computer we were going to be connected to global networks of data, ushered into the era of&nbsp;<em>information</em>. Instead, rather than information, the bulk of home computer processing is dedicated to the production of&nbsp;<em>disinformation</em>: of simulations and games, Sonic the Hedgehog and Super Mario.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">Maybe it's not so strange. Some marketing manager coined 'infotainment' to describe the paradox of information and play and, at heart, cinema also displays the same ambivalence. In the 1870s Étienne Marey and Eadward Muybridge developed the cine camera to help their investigations into animal locomotion. Louis Lumière thought cinema as a tool for scientific research, a way of recording and analysing events, not unlike a computer. It took a showman and conjurer to turn it into a vehicle for mass appeal.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">The showman was Georges Méliès (an exhibition of whose career is still running at the Museum of the Moving Image). The Frenchman was the first fully to explore the fantastic possibilities of film: his favourite genres were fairytales, burlesque and science fiction. Méliès mastered endless unique special effects for making women turn into mermaids, heads to fall off or inflate, bodies dismember themselves and individual limbs go dancing about the screen. He loved the irrational side of film, the erotic, the comic, the macabre.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">Cinema partly derives from photo realism, from the documentary impulse to describe the world, but Méliès represents the other equally important tradition: stage magic, deception, trick photography. Despite his kitsch and playfulness, Méliès probably advanced the genre further than any other single figure. Indeed, by pursuing the lowest possible audience taste, he was testing the form to the highest technical limits. After all, what better proof of the verisimilitude of the moving image than that it convey a sexual charge? And what more graphic demonstration of its capabilities than showing a man removing his head five times, and placing each singing head on a bar of five telegraph wires like so many musical notes?</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">In the history of cinema, play has often been the mother of invention. For the new digital media, this has proved equally true. In the 1970s, in the Californian town of Palo Alto (where Muybridge studied animal locomotion a century before) Rank Xerox set up a research centre. Its aim was to develop the next generation of computers and according to Larry Tesler, one of the core engineers, they soon turned to computer games for inspiration. Millions who found information technology complex and intimidating were less circumspect when it came to playing&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Space Invaders</span> or&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Missile Command</span>. If it appeared as a pacman or asteroid, most were quite happy manipulating electronic data on a VDU. It was this insight that led the development of the 'Graphical user interface', the use of windows, icons, and desktop metaphors to simplify tasks. This interface, in turn, led directly to the launch of Apple MacIntosh and Microsoft Windows and the beginning of the end of IBM. By imitating games personal computing became, through the 1980s, the fastest growing industry&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">ever</span>.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">We are still living through the golden age of computing. Most of the languages, algorithms, and metaphors created today will provide the foundation for the next hundred years. Whether it's a game to save Lemmings from extinction, a beautifully tailored personal organiser, or a screen saver showing flying toasters, current software is a source of much of ingenuity, wit and invention. In a few centuries time the shoot-em-up arcade games that so worry commentators will probably be in display cases at the Design Museum or the V&amp;A. Now that the office market is saturated, corporations are looking to exploit the home market and once again computer games are leading the way.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">Yet, as with the early years of film, official culture refuses to recognise it's crass, nerdish newcomer. The higher arts look down on their pixilated relatives with dismay and disdain. Both film and computer software come from the boiler room of culture, designed by pioneers with a technical or manufacturing background rather than a training in the high arts. This means that achievements tend to go unrecognised until too late, just as the critics began to praise the era of silent movies the moment the talkies came in.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">All of which makes predictions generically difficult. Indeed, this could be the moment the analogy between cinema and the digital domain ends. Unlike the mimetic traditions of photography and film, a new interactive art form might follow an entirely different logic: the logic of simulation. Current computer games such as&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">A-Train</span>or&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Sim City</span> are not really representations of the world but software models, virtual machines sustained by their own mathematical engines. Alternatively, film and computer technology could be converging. Francis Ford Coppola - who used much of the new technology in his underrated&nbsp;<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Dracula</span> - has predicted that it will open film-making to ordinary people. He expresses the hope that one day soon a film masterpiece may be made at home in her room by 'some fat girl in Wisconsin'. In this light digital media could fulfil the promise of cinema, making the manipulation of images and the creation of a new visual language more accessible and seamless.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">According to a Russian maxim, the Fox knows many little things but the Hedgehog knows one big thing. But what is the big thing that Sonic the Hedgehog knows? What else waits to crawl out of the digital swamp?</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">For the moment he is silent.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">&nbsp;</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><span style="font-size: 15px;"><em><strong>Published in New Statesmen July 1993</strong></em></span></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p></div>]]></description>
			<author>pdjukes@gmail.comv15 (Peter Jukes)</author>
			<category>Technology</category>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Jul 1993 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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